Security for the Three Seas region. How could the Polish Presidency in the EU Council enhance the 3SI format and beyond?

Entry, Polish EU Presidency, and the Three Seas Initiative, accurately

In the first half of 2025 (1st January – 30 June), for the second time (the last one in the second half of 2011), Poland led the Council of the European Union.

In these six months, Polish ministers chaired discussions on specific areas of the EU policy. As a result, it allowed for influence on the settling of the Agenda and priorities of the EU Council.

These achievements could have some positive impacts on the the Three Seas Initiative – a regional form of cooperation in Central, Southern and North and Eastern Europe including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Austria, Czechia, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, which aims to develop the infrastructural ties between these states in transport, energy and digitalization.

The above-mentioned successes in the EU arena might be put into the successes within the Three Seas Initiative. Despite the wide range of both the Polish Presidency in the Council of the European Union and the Three Seas Initiative in their security and economic aspects, their potential common links are not very obvious. This analysis concerns, among other this issue and points out part of the concrete, mainly existing instruments and actions that could allow use the achievements of the last Polish Presidency in the EU Council within the Three Seas Initiative.

Exterior and interior defense first!

The widely interpreted security was the main priority of the presidency of Poland in the EU Council. It is a hugely important issue for this state (and is becoming more and more significant for the European Union at once). Therefore, Poland has been experiencing and suffering from the results of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and its other actions that contributed to destabilizing the internal (in Poland) and external geopolitical situation in Central Europe in recent years. The escalation of the war on the Ukrainian territory and the rising attacks and blackmails from Russia in different fields, also earlier (such as military, disinformation, migration pressure, and interrupting supply chains), forced Poland to strengthen its security. Following the “Security, Europe!” motto of the Polish presidency, Poland concentrated on various security aspects such as external, internal, information, business, energy, agriculture and health.

To significant results of the temporary guidance in the European Union Council, often underlined by the Polish officials and on the official site of the Chairmanship, foreign and national military tools are the most considered. From the external mechanisms, the initiation of the SAFE instrument, recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line as strategic projects for Europe’s security and extending existing sanctions and deciding on introducing several ones against Russia are the most highlighted. Regarding the internal measures, a stricter attitude towards irregular migration with boosting external border controls, and launching the Entry-Exit System were taken into consideration as the biggest achievements.

During the Polish Presidency in the European Union Council, in May 2025, a regulation was adopted adopting the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. This new financial tool is to support EU member countries in investing in defence industrial production through joint public procurements, particularly on priority capabilities. Within the SAFE program, the European Union will allocate up to €150 billion for joint defence investments to interested member states.

Upon request, and based on the national plans in the form of competitively priced long-term loans. These funds will be mainly given by the member countries on joint procurements involving at least two states. But, owing to the current international situation amid the potential widespread hybrid attacks, only one member state will be able to get procurement in a particular period. The third countries to the EU, like acceding, candidate and eventual candidate ones, states that collaborate with the Union within the Security and Defence Partnerships (such as Great Britain), Ukraine and EEA-EFTA ones, could be involved in the instrument. It will rely on joint procurements and sell the products from their defence entrepreneurs1. Furthermore, Poland will be the biggest beneficiary of the SAFE funds, getting above 43 billion euros from it2.

The East Shield instrument, launched in May 2024 with a perspective to 2028, is to boost Poland’s resilience to hybrid warfare and potential attacks. Hybrid attacks by Russia and Belarus by weaponizing migration on the eastern border of Poland and the Russian invasion in Ukraine, with its potential hybrid consequences, were the main motives to establish this program. Being an effective response to these challenges, it aims to deter eventual aggressors and ensure the better protection of civilians and soldiers, facilitating the mobility of the Polish military (and obstructing the movements of the enemy armies), and enhancing cooperation in defending borders with the allies from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Moreover, the instrument will contribute to the larger extension of the Polish Armed Forces. The East Shield should be considered as a new and multi-entity involving (including not only the National Defense Ministry but also other ministries and the same institutions on the domestic and local levels engaged in military development). The tool will also be used to sign in broadly understood infrastructure improvement in Poland, with the construction of natural terrain hindrances and fortifications (bunkers and barriers), improving detection, trafficking, and warning systems, creating anti-drone systems and innovative satellite communications, better preparing logistics hubs and forward operating bases, and building roads and bridges3. The initiative will cover the 700 kilometers of the north and eastern borders of the country, such as in the Pomorskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie Voivodeships, which are part of NATO’s eastern flank. Within the total budget of 10 billion złoty, where part of it will be financed from the EU and NATO tools, the innovative technological solutions are planned to be put into practice. Simultaneously, the instrument is part of a wider struggle to strengthen the regional defence infrastructure in collaboration with the Baltic countries, which are also part of the eastern flank of NATO and the EU external land border with Belarus and Russia. In the context of cooperation with security allies, national-level efforts (facilitating the exchange of information between police, border guards, and the Polish Army at the operational level) will be closely coordinated with these partners4. What is worth emphasizing is that Poland is the first state in Europe that makes change the National Recovery Plan to use its funds for defense and civil security5. Additionally, Poland will use some funds from the SAFE program to develop the East Shield initiative6.

As well as the East Shield initiated by Poland, in January 2024, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia established the Baltic Defence Line. This project aims to reinforce the eastern border of the Baltics and NATO at once. The efforts to achieve this goal will include ensuring the closer coordination of building the defence line on their borders (which will be separately financed by every participating state), boosting countries’ defence capabilities and infrastructure and restraining Russia from the eventual military attacks7. Later, in March 2024, the Cabinet of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Ministers approved the Eastern Border Fortification and Counter-mobility Plan, which became part of the Baltic Defence Line. Moreover, the National Armed Forces plan to establish outposts supporting the defence force with strengthened structures and fortification for troops with different terrain-adjusted hindrance lines, ammunition and mine storage and anti-tank trenches (such as dragon’s teeth and anti-tank mines)8.

Successfully, Poland, with the cooperation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, put both the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line in the White Paper as critical projects9.

Less obvious, but also important

Returning to the other most visible security successes of the Polish presidency, an agreed provisional deal between the EU Council and the European Parliament introducing the Entry/Exit digital border management system (EES) deserves a wider discussion. Due to this agreement, EU countries will gain the opportunity to deploy a new border management system for the registration of non-EU citizens’ entry and exit, as well as their passports, fingerprints, and facial images, within the Schengen zone. The EES system will allow member states of the European Union to ensure them up-to-date access to personal data, travel history and information about complying with the authorized period of staying in the Schengen zone of nationals from third countries. This initiative will significantly lower the risk of identity fraud and overstaying the permitted period10. The EU countries will have to introduce the whole system gradually within 180 days. But, due to the preliminary character of the agreement, it has to be confirmed by the EU Council and the EU Parliament before formal acceptance of the deal by both institutions11.

Another important security step taken during the Presidency of Poland in the Council was the adoption of the EU Cybersecurity Blueprint, which is a new plan for managing incidents and cyber crises on a large scale in the European Union. This new plan is to enhance the existing EU cyber cooperation networks, better defining the crucial roles of the European Agencies devoted to cybersecurity (such as ENISA and EU-CyCLONe) and ensure better political and civil-military coordination of the public communication during the cyber incidents, and with NATO at once12.

Apart from the security dimension of the Polish Presidency, the second one was also highly prioritized, namely the competitiveness of the EU companies and industry. Within the realization of this priority, five Omnibus packages facilitating entrepreneurship were created. They will reduce the number of the previous obligatory reports and statements, and simplify financing the investments and regulations in agriculture, defence and the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)13.

The achievements of the Polish Presidency and the Three Seas Initiative. How to synchronize them?

First of all, during the discussion of the successes of the Chairmanship of Poland in the EU Council in the first half of 2025, some other decisions could require the bigger attention. Among others, the adoption of the 17th and sanction package and preparing the 18th one on Russian entities, signing the introduction of the €1.9 billion worth Instrument for Pre-accession Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, and the reached compromise in ensuring the bigger access to cheap medicines within the pharmaceutical sector, could be added to the efforts of the Polish Presidency.

But, due to the character of this analysis and its potential connection between the Polish Presidency within the EU and the Three Seas Initiative, some issues were limited to the most obvious and characteristic ones during the mentioned period. Like the main-analyzed decisions by Poland in the EU Council, some of the others are eventually connected to the Three Seas format and broader regional cooperation in Central Europe, and could contribute effectively in these forms of collaboration.

Regarding the SAFE instrument and Poland’s probable priorities for its contribution, the funds will be allocated for the purchase of new military equipment (ammunition, drones, and anti-drone systems), as well as its modernization and expansion, rather than for dual-use infrastructure (used for both transport and military purposes)14. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have similar priorities in allocating SAFE funds that are to increase their own defence capabilities, adding the need to involve the defence industry more in the public procurements and increasing military aid to Ukraine15.

But, based on speeches of some officials from Poland and the Baltic states and other goals of these countries in allocating finances from the SAFE instrument, there could be an assignment to the cross-border cooperation16. Within the continuation of the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line implementations, they could synchronize them in joint projects in protecting the northeastern flank of NATO, including military actions (conducting joint exercises along the border and other joint trainings) and infrastructure equipment (anti-bank obstacles and bunkers and strengthening the surveillance systems), and preventing the disinformation directed at them (by, among others, ensuring better contacts between particular services from Poland and the Baltics).

Moreover, the synergy between the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line should be enhanced in the development of the cross-border investments devoted to transport, energy and digitalization. In this context, according to the Joint Declaration of the 10th Three Seas Summit, the member countries emphasized the need to deploy military mobility in the 3SI region. In the document, it was declared officially for the first time to implement 7 concrete projects. At least 4 of them refer to the development of the North-South axis in Europe and have dual-use (civilian and military) significance – Rail Baltica, Rail-2-Sea, Via Baltica and Via Carpatia17. Additionally, not only the Three Seas transportation undertaking (adding the High-Speed Railways connecting the Central Solidarity Hub in Warsaw with other countries), but also energy and digitalization ones could play a dual-use role. The energy investments include the North South Gas Corridor (with commissioned and expanded LNG Terminal as an example in Poland and the Baltics), the Integration and synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity system with the European networks. What is more, some digital ones might be confirmed, such as the 5G Cross-Border Transport Corridors in the Baltics, the Development of Cross-Border Network of Data Centres and the Cross-Border Optical Fibre Network18. Their constructions, and other civil-military ones, could be supported within the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2 and contribute to the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO, which was declared in the Three Seas Joint Declaration in 202419.

Within NATO, some initiatives devoted to the infrastructure development between Poland and the Baltic states, and wider in the Three Seas Initiative, could be intensified due to the Baltic Sentry and some other infrastructure-related instruments like the DIANA program. The first-mentioned activity, announced on 14th January 2025 during the Baltic Sea Allies Summit, is to enhance the critical infrastructure protection, with the boosted military presence of NATO in the Baltic Sea region and increase the ability of its states to respond to the destabilization acts20. Importantly, the program was established in a time and response of increased sabotage, particularly from Russia, like damage to the submarine and power cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea region21. Regards the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, called DIANA22, it is the initiative that ensures firms the resources, networks and leads to invest in deep technologies to address the security and critical defence challenges. DIANA, in collaboration with the private, non-governmental and academic sectors, provides companies with access to the specialized knowledge, business support and the scientific and laboratory infrastructure to help them in developing and commercializing their products. On the other hand, only above 70 firms (as of 2025, and smaller numbers in previous years) participate in the program23. Despite the strongly reduced number of companies engaging in the initiative, it is one of the examples of how NATO could support the infrastructure development of its members, also ones in the 3SI area.

Summary

In the first half of 2025, Poland held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Even though the Polish Chairmanship achieved at least some important goals, it was mainly concentrated on the external and internal security. This field ought to be the first reference to the development of the potential from the Presidency within the same formats of cooperation in Central, South and Eastern Europe, where a lot of countries are members or participating states of the Three Seas Initiative.

In relation to the concrete biggest successes of the Polish Chairmanship in the EU in the first half of 2025, primarily the adoption of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defence Line as strategic projects for Europe’s security, were the biggest and most recognizable achievements. Moreover, Poland contributed to the initiation of the Entry/Exit System (EES) to improve the management of the Schengen border and the implementation of the EU Cybersecurity Blueprint, increasing the level of cybersecurity across the EU. To other significant aspects, the facilitating regulations of the competitiveness of the EU entrepreneurship were an additional success of the Presidency of Poland in the EU Council. Another important aspect was boosting the competitiveness of European businesses by simplifying regulations.

Poland became the largest beneficiary of the SAFE and it will receive over €43 billion to modernize and expand its defense infrastructure. The other states that participate in the program will also get funds for the modernization and expansion of their military capabilities. Furthermore, the SAFE instrument is to encourage the member states (and some closely collaborating with the EU ones like the United Kingdom and Ukraine) to take part in the joint procurement in defense. This program could be strongly synchronized with the implementation of the East Shield in Poland and the Baltic Defense Line in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Both of these initiatives aim to strengthen their defence infrastructure (among others, structures, fortifications, drones, anti-drones capabilities, ammunition and anti-tank ones) and eastern borders and the improvement of restraining Russia from the potential military attacks.

Another analyzed aspect was the synergy between the last Polish EU Presidency with the Three Seas Initiative, precisely the synergy between the achievements of the mentioned Poland’s Chairmanship in the European Union and their implementation within the 3SI format. The primary results of the Polish EU Presidency could be put into realization within the Three Seas, particularly in accordance with the 3SI member states’ plans in the military. Namely, especially the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line, and concrete effective actions done within them, should be the first reference in the implementation of the developed standards into the Three Seas Initiative. The intensified cooperation in the joint projects between Poland and other countries (in particular the Baltic states), being part of the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line, ought to be done to defend the NATO northeastern flank, like joint trainings at the border and other military actions and information transfer.

Regarding the more direct initiatives between the achievements of Poland’s last EU Presidency and the Three Seas Initiative, they could and ought to be very correlated. Within the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line, some cross-border and dual-use projects (directed to the civilian and military infrastructure) could be implemented.

1

Council of the European Union. “SAFE: Council Adopts €150 Billion Boost for Joint Procurement on European Security and Defence.” Accessed August 25, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/27/safe-council-adopts-150-billion-boost-for-joint-procurement-on-european-security-and-defence/

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Achievements in Field of External Security & Defence Funding.” Accessed August 25, 2025. https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/achievemements-in-field-of-external-security-defence-funding/

2

European Commission. “SAFE – Security Action for Europe.” Accessed September 28, 2025. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

3

Ministry of National Defence, Poland. “East Shield.” Accessed August 24, 2025. https://tarczawschod.wp.mil.pl/en/

Institute of Central Europe. “RIESW 2024-02-10.” P. 7–9. Accessed August 24, 2025. https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/riesw_2024-02-10.pdf.

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Achievements in Field of External Security & Defence Funding.” Accessed August 25, 2025. https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/achievemements-in-field-of-external-security-defence-funding/

4

Ministry of National Defence, Poland. “East Shield.” Accessed August 24, 2025. https://tarczawschod.wp.mil.pl/en/

5

Prime Minister of Poland. “NATO Reaffirms Full Security Guarantees to Poland.” Accessed August 25, 2025.

https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/nato-reaffirms-full-security-guarantees-to-poland

6

Ministry of National Defence, Poland. “Major Achievements of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in Key Areas for the Ministry of National Defence.” Accessed August 25, 2025.

https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/major-achievements-of-the-polish-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union-in-key-areas-for-the-ministry-of-national-defence

7

Ministry of Defence, Latvia. “Border Fortification.” Accessed August 25, 2025. https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/border-fortification

8

Ibidem, Accessed August 28, 2025.

9

Ministry of National Defence, Poland. “Major Achievements of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in Key Areas for the Ministry of National Defence.” Accessed August 25, 2025.

https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/major-achievements-of-the-polish-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union-in-key-areas-for-the-ministry-of-national-defence

10

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Border Management: EU Provisionally Agrees on Progressive Launch of Entry/Exit System.” Accessed September 28, 2025. https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/border-management-eu-provisionally-agrees-on-progressive-launch-of-entryexit-system/

11

Council of the European Union. “Border Management: Council and European Parliament Strike Agreement about Progressive Launch of Entry/Exit System.” Accessed September 28, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2025/05/19/border-management-council-and-european-parliament-strike-agreement-about-progressive-launch-of-entryexit-system/

12

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Adopts Cyber Crisis Management Plan.” Accessed September 28, 2025. https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/eu-adopts-cyber-crisis-management-plan/

13

Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Programme: Results by Council Configuration.” Accessed September 28, 2025. https://polish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/results-by-council-configuration/

14

Ministry of National Defence, Poland. “€43.7 Billion from SAFE Programme Will Go to Poland.” Accessed August 25, 2025.

WNP.pl. “MON: Jeszcze w tym miesiącu lista projektów w ramach SAFE.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.wnp.pl/bezpieczenstwo/polityka-obronna/mon-jeszcze-w-tym-miesiacu-lista-projektow-w-ramach-safe,1003745.html.

According to the plans of the Ministry of National Defense of Poland, until the end of November, the list of concrete projects within the SAFE program will be introduced (the same concerns the other EU states). But, basing on the character of the instrument and the declarations of some government officials, Władysław Kosiniak Kamysz (Deputy Minister and Minister of National Defense) and Paweł Zalewski (Deputy Minister of National Defense), they will be assigned for the above-mentioned investments.

15

LRT.lt. “EU Commission Approves €6.3 Billion for Lithuania in Tentative Defence Fund.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2672219/eu-commission-approves-eur6-3-billion-for-lithuania-in-tentative-defence-fund.

Ministry of Defence, Latvia. “International and Regional Cooperation: European Union.” Accessed November 16, 2025.

Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament). “The Riigikogu Supports Creating SAFE Loan Instrument to Promote Defence Industry in Europe.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/press-releases/european-union-affairs-committee-en/the-riigikogu-supports-creating-safe-loan-instrument-to-promote-defence-industry-in-europe/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia. “Comment by Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna on Proposal to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://vm.ee/en/news/comment-foreign-minister-margus-tsahkna-proposal-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der

16

Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament). “The Riigikogu Supports Creating SAFE Loan Instrument to Promote Defence Industry in Europe.” Accessed November 16, 2025.

17

Three Seas Initiative. “Joint Declaration 2025.” P. 3–4. Accessed November 16, 2025. https://3si.politic.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Joint-Declaration_2025.pdf

18

Three Seas Initiative. “Progress Report.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://3seas.eu/about/progressreport

19

Three Seas Initiative. “Joint Declaration of the Ninth Summit of the Three Seas Initiative.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://3seas.eu/media/news/joint-declaration-of-the-ninth-summit-of-the-three-seas-initiative

20

NATO. “NATO Launches Baltic Sentry to Increase Critical Infrastructure Security.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/01/14/nato-launches-baltic-sentry-to-increase-critical-infrastructure-security

21

Prime Minister of Poland. “Baltic Sentry – A New NATO Mission.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/baltic-sentry–a-new-nato-mission

22

Three Seas Business Council. “Dual-Use Infrastructure: The 4× Return — Security, Mobility, Growth, Sovereignty” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://3seasbc.com/archiwa/9601

23

Athena University Grant Office. “Over 70 Companies Chosen to Join NATO’s 2025 Accelerator Programme for Defence Innovation.” Accessed December 17, 2024. https://grantoffice.athenauni.eu/2024/12/17/over-70-companies-chosen-to-join-natos-2025-accelerator-programme-for-defence-innovation/.

NATO DIANA. “2024 Cohort of Companies.” Accessed November 16, 2025. https://www.diana.nato.int/about-diana/2024-cohort-of-companies.html

Photo: (source: president.pl)

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