Hamada Jaber: Trump may be attempting to save Israel from the policies of Netanyahu

Trump may be attempting to save Israel from the policies of Netanyahu and his government. The sense of isolation became visible after the attack on Qatar, not necessarily because the United States disapproved, but due to the global reaction. Qatar successfully organized an Islamic Arab summit within days of the attack, securing the solidarity of all attending nations. In fact, this solidarity extended globally, encompassing European, Arab, and Islamic countries— says Hamada Jaber, a Palestinian political analyst and researcher from Ramallah. 

The ceasefire has been in effect for a couple of weeks and its implementation has encountered some obstacles. There appears to have been attempts to sabotage it the Israelis. Nevertheless, we are seeing people in Gaza receive proper food for the first time in months. While the overall situation is arguably an improvement, what is your assessment of the agreement, particularly from your vantage point on the ground in Ramallah?

To be frank, considering the state of affairs immediately preceding the ceasefire, I had anticipated a far less favourable agreement for both Palestinians and Hamas. It is certainly not a perfect deal. However, considering the American position, specifically that under Trump, the surrounding regional dynamics, and the nature of the current Israeli government, it is… well, it’s understandable.

We remain sceptical; there is doubt about the durability of the agreement. Some believe it is merely a temporary pause. Given the totality of the circumstances, I believe it may be the best outcome Hamas could have achieved. I cannot elaborate further.

What has been the reaction to this development in the West Bank?

The most important sentiment for every Palestinian is the relief and hope that the war is genuinely over. People are undeniably happy about the cessation of hostilities and deeply wish for the ceasefire to hold. However, there is also a palpable fear that the Israeli government will now intensify its focus on the West Bank.

This anxiety is rooted in the daily reality here: incidents and attacks by settlers occur frequently, and the Israeli army conducts raids—invading nearly all the cities, villages, and towns almost every night and day. This is the prevailing situation.

A popular belief suggests that the key factor prompting Donald Trump to intervene and broker this ceasefire was the Israeli attack on Qatar. The theory is that Qatar exercised leverage by threatening to halt Trump’s business operations in the Gulf unless he pressured the Israelis to stop. What is your perspective on this? 

The attack on Qatar certainly appeared to be a turning point, yet I find it difficult to believe the United States had been unaware of it beforehand. 

What was officially stated is that they were informed only ten minutes prior, or something to that effect. I find that unlikely, particularly considering the largest US military base in the Middle East is in Qatar.

Furthermore, I struggle to accept that Qatar could effectively coerce the US through the business threats you mentioned. However, Trump offered an alternative rationale: he observed that Israel was becoming increasingly isolated internationally and wished to rescue it from that position.

This is an explanation that is both comprehensible and plausible as the motivating factor. Otherwise, I find the intervention difficult to justify. Yes, I believe this isolation was the main cause behind Trump’s initiative.

Trump may also be attempting to save Israel from the policies of Netanyahu and his government. The sense of isolation became visible after the attack on Qatar, not necessarily because the United States disapproved, but due to the global reaction. Qatar successfully organized an Islamic Arab summit within days of the attack, securing the solidarity of all attending nations. In fact, this solidarity extended globally, encompassing European, Arab, and Islamic countries. Again, I maintain that Israel’s increasing isolation was the main catalyst.

Nevertheless, if we recall Trump’s rhetoric just a few months ago, regarding the proposed transfer of the population to Egypt, Jordan, and other places—the so-called “Riviera of the Middle East” comment – it is hard to believe that the war has truly ended. There is concern that Trump might reverse his position tomorrow.

Yes, and that volatility is what causes us worry. The same figure who was just threatening to transfer, or asking countries to receive, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is now saying, “No, we are going to rebuild Gaza for its people.” I certainly hope this outcome prevails. However, given the unpredictability and disposition of a personality like Trump, there is simply no guarantee of anything.

I believe he perceived Israel’s isolation and acted on it. In his phone call with Netanyahu, he reportedly said, “You can’t fight the entire world,” indicating a need to halt the hostilities. In the end, Trump is trying to save Israel from its own government.

Did Mahmoud Abbas play any role in it, as the official Palestinian leader? 

I believe Abbas was the last party consulted on this deal, and his role is likely to remain marginalized in future considerations.

We are currently observing a distinct axis between, for example, Qatar and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Is Erdoğan genuinely popular in Palestine, and why do you believe he is currently devoting such considerable attention to Gaza?

Historically, the popularity of Turkey and President Erdoğan was high among Palestinians, although we lack recent polling data to confirm its current status. At one point, perhaps around 2018 or 2019—roughly seven or eight years ago—surveys indicated that Erdoğan and Turkey commanded the highest levels of satisfaction compared to all other regional and international leaders. I don’t know if that remains the case, but generally speaking, Turkey and Erdoğan are viewed positively by the Palestinian population.

However, during the initial stages of this conflict—this genocide—Turkey did not demonstrate a strong position until recently. 

So why this shift now? 

I cannot be certain, but it seems they identified an opportunity.

This connects back to Trump: who exactly persuaded him to change his stance or direction? We know Erdoğan and Trump have maintained a good relationship, evident in their meeting during the UN summit in New York. Crucially, Erdoğan also maintains a robust relationship with Hamas.

It is probable that he approached Trump, addressing the latter’s consistent stated goal of securing the release of the hostages. Erdoğan may have essentially offered a guarantee, suggesting: “If the release of the hostages is truly your primary objective, I can assure you that Hamas will free all of them within a few days.” As long as a certain level of mutual trust existed between them, this scenario could have prompted Trump to agree to this course of action.

Finally, what is your assessment of the ceasefire agreement itself? It is structured in different stages, and we are currently in the initial phase. This phase involves a preparation for a new administration in Gaza. Do you genuinely imagine Hamas handing back control over Gaza, or do you view that as a mere fantasy?

I believe the presence of Hamas in Gaza will certainly persist. What they are doing now—maintaining a visible role—is intended to prevent a power vacuum until a new committee and stabilization forces can take charge. They are actively trying to ensure a degree of stability.

However, that does not suggest they will maintain the same level of authority. I do not anticipate that. I believe they are committed to the agreement and will not participate in the governing body that is established.

In fact, even before October 7th, they were attempting to limit their direct control over Gaza for various reasons. At that time, I believe their goal was to emulate the Hezbollah model in Lebanon: they would not be the formal government, but they would retain their own arms, control specific areas, and maintain an untouchable security presence. They were attempting to implement that model in Gaza even before the recent conflict.

For this reason, I believe they are not genuinely interested in governing Gaza.

The fact that they actually governed Gaza, wasn’t that the primary source of their popularity? Every service, every school, every hospital had people from Hamas working for the people. Wasn’t that the main source of their legitimacy and broad popularity among Palestinians?

No, the only service that might have boosted Hamas’s popularity is security. As for other services, like health and education, one must remember that 70% of Gazans are refugees. The entity primarily responsible for health and education services for this majority is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), not Hamas or any other government. Even for the remaining 30% of the population, a portion of the salaries for employees in public hospitals and schools is paid by the Palestinian Authority (PA), not solely by Hamas.

My point is that the essential services are not predominantly provided by Hamas. I believe the most important service Hamas provided was security. People in Gaza have always understood that Hamas’s potential is severely limited when it comes to delivering comprehensive services or development, given the constraints. However, people appreciated the security element. 

What do you mean by that? 

We can see often survey perceptions of corruption, and the perception of corruption within Hamas-controlled institutions in Gaza has consistently been reported as lower compared to that within Palestinian Authority institutions. Though the corruption level may still be high generally, it is less than that associated with the PA.

So, the popular view is that Hamas is less corrupt than the PA and, crucially, managed to deliver on security services. This, combined with their role in the resistance, is likely the main source of their support. When it comes to pure popularity based on elections, Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006 before they took control of Gaza in 2007. We haven’t had formal elections since then to truly measure their popularity. However, based on the factors I just mentioned, I do not believe their popularity stems from the daily services they provided. They may have managed to maintain some popularity due to these other factors.

And what about the opposition to Hamas? We observed fighting in Gaza, particularly following the agreement, between Hamas and certain local militias. What information do you have on these groups? Who are these individuals, and are they, in fact, receiving support from Israel?

Yes, definitely. The first, and most prominent group we heard about, was led by an individual named Yasser. He was actually in prison for criminal offences and had a criminal record before the war. Naturally, he is opposed to Hamas, and Israel has admitted to cooperating with and supporting these groups. They eventually specified that they were working with four such factions. I lack detailed information on the others, but these groups largely consist of criminals or local strongmen who wield influence within certain families. They may have historical grievances with Hamas or previously held security positions under the Palestinian Authority before Hamas took control in 2007. I believe the motivation for these groups is fragmented—it is not unified political opposition—and Israel is clearly attempting to exploit them for leverage. 

However, ultimately, I believe they are small groups that lack significant influence.

There is also a narrative suggesting that since 52% of Gaza is currently under Israeli control, Israel intends to arm collaborating Palestinians in those areas, potentially creating a situation similar to Afghanistan. Do you believe this is a plausible scenario, and would it actually succeed?

I do not believe it is going to work, and I cannot envision it succeeding. I noted that when Hamas began clashing with these factions, even Trump intervened and asked them to stop. I am unsure if the agreement contains a clause prohibiting Hamas from engaging with such groups.

Regardless of any official agreement, I think it is only a matter of time. Whether it is Hamas, or even smaller groups and individuals, they simply will not accept such bodies being responsible for anything in the future. They will resolve these collaborator groups. I see no future for them.

How do you envision the future development, specifically concerning this territorial issue? Do you anticipate Israel will actually withdraw, or will they use that occupied territory as a staging ground for future attacks on Gaza? Given the ongoing discussion about disarmament and establishing a new administration, and the debate over whether Palestinians will genuinely participate, how do you see the situation evolving in the coming weeks and months?  

Well, the current preparation involves the UN Security Council issuing a resolution to form these international stability-keeping forces. Once these forces or troops are deployed, likely along the borders, I think Israel will eventually lose interest in maintaining a presence, and I see no strategic reason for them to remain. 

Again, this heavily relies on American involvement and intentions.

If the United States has genuine, positive intentions and is committed to all phases of this agreement—including negotiations regarding the future of a Palestinian state—then I believe Israel will eventually withdraw from the entire Gaza Strip, especially given the presence of these international forces. That is my prediction, provided the intentions, particularly from America, are sincere.

Do you believe Prime Minister Netanyahu is still incentivized to initiate another conflict—whether with Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, or even with Iran—simply to remain in power?

Yes. The most genuinely surprising aspect of Trump’s current position concerns the West Bank. He has repeatedly stated, and shown clear determination, that he will not allow Netanyahu and Israel to annex any part of the territory. This stance is highly unexpected, especially since his original plan, deal of the century in his first term as a US president , essentially guaranteed Israel a minimum of 30% of the West Bank, encompassing the Jordan Valley. That concession was widely viewed as non-negotiable.

I struggle to understand why he is now changing course and displaying such rigid opposition to annexation. It feels erratic. However, this pressure effectively puts Netanyahu in a corner, which, as you suggest, could push him to seek an external conflict.

From what we can observe Iran remains a major concern. Furthermore, we see daily attacks on Lebanon. 

Netanyahu seems intent on keeping at least these two fronts active. Iran is consistently cited by Israelis as the biggest threat, and having attacked before, the thought that they might “repeat the job” because it wasn’t finished remains.

It is worth noting that Netanyahu’s popularity is still high in Israel. Despite all the challenges, he remains the most popular leader and could potentially push for new elections. It is genuinely difficult to assess whether Netanyahu is acting solely under intense American pressure, or if he strategically agrees to certain terms. However, given his persistent popularity, he is in a position where he might indeed call for new elections.

On a related note, Trump has even brought up the significant subject of releasing Marwan Barghouti from prison. A few years ago, I believed that both Israel and the American intellectual community might eventually endorse Barghouti. In my view, he is perhaps the only figure who could successfully “sell” another two decades of the peace process—with all its flawed solutions and complexities. If a figure like that is needed now, they might push for Barghouti’s release and perhaps a role for him in the Gaza Strip.

In the end the body that will be on the ground, dealing directly with the populace of the Gaza Strip, will certainly be composed of Palestinians. However, the mechanism and the authority overseeing them remain unclear. Nevertheless, I believe that the committee responsible for managing affairs directly in Gaza will unquestionably be Palestinian.

Hamada Jaber is a Palestinian political analyst and researcher born in Jerusalem. He holds a master’s degree in strategic studies from S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations School (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore, 2023. He also holds a master’s degree in Peacekeeping & Security Studies from the Faculty of Political Science in Roma Tre University and a bachelor’s degree in business administration from The Arab American University, 2006, Palestine.He is associated with Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PCPSR), an independent non-profit institution and think tank. The Center was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. Hamada Jaber is also a political activist and co-founder and a volunteer board member in One State Foundation (OSF), a foundation officially established in 2017 in the Netherlands, having Palestinian, Israelis, and International members and supporters to promote one-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis and the international actors.

Cover photo: Donald Trump and Binyamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, 2017. Source.

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