Germany’s youth – digitalised and polarised
Posted by Thomas Klikauer
The fact Germany’s youth is 72.4 hours per week online, is no longer shocking. Nor is the fact that they take will their mobile phone to most unusual place – like a swimming pool.
A recent study on Germany’s youth found that many young people are digitized, politicized, and – worse – polarized. This is based on social media – corporate online platforms – and the feeds of young people around Germany’s recent election, held in early 2025.
The 2025 election shows that the results among young voters reflect the domineering power of corporate online platforms. Those who closely watch how successful Germany’s political parties are online understood that some platforms offered surprisingly accurate predictions of the electoral behavior of Germany’s youngest voters.
A significantly changed voting pattern was noticeable – with substantial gains on the progressive side of politics and, sadly or rather: worryingly, also on the far-right and neo-Nazi side.
While in Germany’s 2021 election one in four young voters supported the socialist party Die Linke, in the 2025 federal election this share increased by 17%. Disturbingly, the authoritarian, racist, ultra-nationalist, and deeply anti-democratic AfD became the second-strongest party among 18-to-24-year-olds, receiving 21% of the youth vote – an increase of 14% compared to 2021.
Of course, the fact that young people display volatile voting behavior is not new. Yet the key phenomenon is that those who use corporate online platforms (euphemistically labelled “social media”) disproportionately rely on them for political information – 74% of 16-to-27-year-olds, to be precise.
Unsurprisingly, the information reaching Germany’s youth is increasingly determined by the algorithms of these corporate platforms. Since their business model is based on the formula
clicks = advertising revenue = profits
algorithms feed young people political content that decisively influences whether and how they politicize themselves.
Cunningly, in the world of media capitalism, the interests of platform corporations (profits) and the interests of right-wing populists and extremists coincide. In short: capitalism and the far right win; young people, democracy, and society lose.
These feeds cannot be understood apolitically. Neither algorithms nor technology are neutral under media capitalism. Yet these algorithms have a highly significant influence, as they decide which political content becomes visible and which does not. In other words, they shape, influence, and even manipulate political reality – and therefore voting behavior, and ultimately, democracy itself.
Worryingly, even the integrity of election campaigns is now dramatically influenced by the algorithms of U.S. tech corporations.
For most of the public, however, an understanding of what causes the far-right dominance in these online feeds is still lacking. Much of what occurs on such corporate online platforms cannot be viewed transparently by users due to corporate secrecy – generally camouflaged as “business model.”
Worse still, a corporate interest in disclosing these business models is not to be expected. When such business models (read: corporate profits) merge with the sensationalism of right-wing populists, the dominance of the AfD on these platforms is assured.
The AfD’s dominance is also partly due to its early entry and intensive use of these platforms. In the digital society of the 21st century, political communication has long ceased to be limited to traditional media such as newspapers, television, and radio.
Online media platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, Instagram (Facebook is for old people), and X (Elon Musk’s rebranded Twitter) have become central venues for political debate, the shaping of discussions, and – increasingly – for far-right manipulation. This has major consequences for democratic processes worldwide.
Especially young people today use these platforms as their primary source of information. This gives the far-right an exceptionally strong influence on the shaping – or manipulation – of political opinions, and potentially also on voting behavior.
Worse still, the importance, shaping, and manipulative power of corporate online platforms go well beyond direct communication. Political attitudes are increasingly becoming part of one’s identity – visible in profile pictures, shared posts, and online comments.
These are the areas in which noteworthy changes in our increasingly “digitalized” democracy are becoming apparent – not only in Germany’s 2025 election.
While “likes” and “followers” have not yet replaced classic forms of political participation, they can reinforce and reshape traditional political affiliations.
Those – like the authoritarian and anti-democratic AfD – who successfully communicate ideological content on Germany’s “Big Four” (TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, X) not only manipulate political discourse but are also empowered to manipulate political reality itself.
Behind the backs of users, what Germany’s youth perceive as “political reality” is, in fact, ideologically constructed and fabricated by the AfD’s party apparatchiks.
Against this background, it becomes rather obvious which political party dominated the algorithmically mediated information offered to 21- to 25-year-olds on corporate platforms during the recent Bundestag election: the neo-fascist AfD.
A recent report by Potsdam University analyzed around 2.6 million posts collected in January and February 2025. This included posts from official party accounts and those tagged with party-specific hashtags such as #btw25, #politics, #sonntagsfrage, #democracy, #economy, #climate, #mietendeckel, #germany, and #migration; supposedly “neutral” hashtags like #comedy, #dogs, #music, #nature, #travel; and party tags like #spd (social-democratic) or #fdp (neoliberal).
Significant differences emerged between platforms: on TikTok, 11% of posts had a political connection; on X, about 25%; on YouTube, 1.5%; and on Instagram, just under 1%.
The Big Four differ in content format: all use visuals, but X specializes in short text posts; YouTube (shorts) and TikTok in videos; and Instagram in image sequences.
In Germany, political communication is very present on TikTok and X, while it appears less on YouTube and Instagram.
The time until a post with a party hashtag is shown also differs: on TikTok and X it’s fast (1–2 hours), while on Instagram and YouTube it takes much longer.
On all four platforms, posts containing “#afd” are recommended earlier than others. On TikTok, for instance, a video with “#afd” appears in young users’ feeds within 11–12 minutes. By contrast, a “#fdp” video takes more than 90 minutes; CDU/CSU about 31 minutes; SPD about 70.
On X, “#afd” is recommended after about 50 minutes, while “#fdp” takes around 102 minutes. Instagram takes an average of three hours; YouTube Shorts up to 12.
A video tagged “#afd” is shown on Instagram after about 170 minutes; for “#fdp” it takes nearly 500. On YouTube, “#afd” videos appear fastest (around 270 minutes), followed by the Greens, while “The Left” waits almost 640 minutes.
In short, TikTok’s algorithm pushes political content far faster than Instagram’s. Even more worryingly, the AfD dominates across all platforms (40–50%). No other party exceeds 25%. On TikTok:
- Over 50% of all party-specific hashtags belong to the AfD;
- 15% to the CDU;
- 12% to Die Linke;
- 8% to the SPD;
- and just 3% to the FDP.
On YouTube, smaller parties (FDP and Die Linke) are rarely shown (1%). The AfD dominates (44%), with the SPD and CDU at about 20%.
TikTok and X are where Germany’s 21- to 25-year-olds encounter the most political content. TikTok remains especially popular – about half of those under 25 use it – mainly for entertainment, trends, celebrity “news,” and increasingly, politics.
Political parties in Germany use TikTok and X strategically, but differently. In 2025, TikTok had about 20.5 million monthly active users in Germany; X around 10.5 million. The neo-fascist AfD maintains a particularly strong presence on both, especially TikTok. The SPD is also active, though less so.
Interestingly, nearly every relevant figure or institution of the Greens (95%) and the FDP (94%) has an X account for political communication. About two-thirds of the Greens are active on TikTok; the FDP less so (42%). The CDU is weak on TikTok (44%) and stronger on X (72%), while Die Linke occupies middle ground.
Platform algorithms recommend content from official party accounts (OPAs) at different rates:
- Die Linke: 312 videos;
- AfD: 229;
- SPD: 175;
- CDU: 144;
- Greens: 110;
- FDP: 57.
However, in total frequency, official AfD videos are recommended 3,181 times by TikTok’s algorithm, compared with Die Linke (2,295), SPD (1,179), Greens (518), and CDU (400).
AfD Führer and far-right demagogue Alice Weidel is particularly central, with 2,764 posts, while other AfD accounts (e.g., @afdfraktionimbundestag, 112 posts) are far less visible.
This shows that the platform algorithms do not merely replicate posting volume but disproportionately amplify content from both Die Linke (a democratic socialist party) and – worringly – the neo-fascist AfD (an authoritarian party).
Still worse, across all platforms – the Big Four – the AfD is “by far” the most represented party, flooding Germany’s youth with far-right ideology.
Compared to democratic parties, the AfD ensures that its posts are played out quickly, frequently, and especially to many 21- to 25-year-olds.
Good results are also seen for the CDU, SPD, and Die Linke, but the FDP’s content remains least visible. Engagement metrics suggest that not only views and likes but also comments drive a post’s algorithmic reach.
The AfD – flooding social media with targeted ideological content – follows the propaganda strategy of Donald Trump’s far-right media advisor Steve Bannon: “Flood the Zone with Shit” (OUP, 2025).
While most of Germany’s democratic parties – the FDP, SPD, Die Linke, and the Greens – present themselves simply in a positive way, the Greens pursue a more topic-focused strategy rather than direct party promotion.
Yet communication patterns differ by platform: on TikTok, cross-party critical and informative styles dominate, while on X, emotional and aggressive attacks prevail – especially from the neo-fascist AfD. Humor is almost absent on X but appears moderately on TikTok.
Crucially, the AfD’s success cannot be explained by superior engagement strategies. All parties use similar techniques.
Instead, TikTok’s and X’s recommendation algorithms for users aged 21–25 tend to favor AfD content. These platforms deem such content more likely to attract engagement – and thus easier to monetize.
The AfD’s far-right aggressiveness, sensationalism, emotional outbursts, insults, and bullying align perfectly with the profit-driven logic of platform capitalism – clicks = ads = profits – unlike the factual, sober content of the CDU, SPD, Greens, FDP, or Die Linke.
In a strange symbiosis, corporate profits meet far-right ideology. This not only pushes the neo-fascist AfD to the top of what young people consume online but also explains the party’s surging approval among a cohort – the youth – once associated with progressive and environmental politics.
Even more disturbing: this is the point where capitalism meets fascism in an almost perfect synergy – neither needs, depends on, favors, nor seeks democracy.
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