Corporate lobbying & Germany’s military-industrial complex
Posted by Thomas Klikauer
In the early days of capitalism, and as a reaction to a growing working class and rising trade unions, the capital side of the equation introduced pro-business lobbying organizations. To this day, these seek to counteract – or, preferably, eliminate – trade unions. These organizations are euphemistically labelled employer associations.
Worse, they operate in addition to the invented right to manage. In other words, the overwhelming power of corporations wasn’t enough:
- pro-business press,
- corporate online platforms,
- private TV and radio channels,
- conservative and neoliberal political parties, and finally,
- capitalism itself, which sets up, shapes, and influences state-sponsored auxiliary support structures like schools, universities, the police, and the legal system.
To further beef up the pro-capital institutions of society, capital, seemingly, needs two basic organizations to fight those already structurally disadvantaged. Put simply:
- Management works against trade unions inside companies.
- Employer associations work against trade unions across society.
In Germany, two main organizations embody capital’s efforts to fight trade unions and any form of state regulation that could even potentially benefit workers:
- BDA: The Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) – set explicitly against trade unions. Its history is long and, at times, rather dark. One of its former bosses – Hanns Martin Schleyer (Nazi Party member no. 227.014) – not only enjoyed open-roof car rides with Reichsführer-SS Reinhard Heydrich through the streets of Prague, he also ran a side business buying slave labour for Nazi concentration camps from his SS friends.
- BDI: The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) – the more lobbying-oriented setup. Its work includes building alliances with other pro-business institutions to foster a climate supportive of companies and corporate capitalism.
Today, it is the BDI that holds the strategic position of domination. One reason: its role in Germany’s military-industrial complex.
Recently, the BDI’s importance was significantly amplified – in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rise of militaristic propaganda à la Donald Trump.
With strong backing from corporate lobbying, Germany’s capital relations continue to unfold – because capital owners and their managers keep exploiting so-called “security constraints,” the latest legitimizing ideology following the Ukraine war.
In all this, the key player in Germany is the “BDI” – not to be confused with the BDA. But that’s not all.
As Germany’s prime lobbying institution of capitalism, the BDI holds the power to sway any coalition government. Its latest lobbying targeted the 2025 coalition – formed between the conservative CDU/CSU and the still mildly social-democratic SPD. This is not new.
Over a century ago, in 1914, on the eve of World War I, the SPD supported what became known as Burgfriedenspolitik.
This circle the wagons strategy was meant to establish “internal peace” (read: suppress trade unions) while preparing for war abroad.
In short, German capital had every interest in pushing nationalism and militarism while simultaneously eliminating class conflict. Much of that continues to this day.
When the BDI praised the 2025 coalition, it became clear its demands had been taken into account. Corporate lobbying had once again proven extremely successful.
In principle, what the BDI demands from politics is simple: the implementation of BDI’s demands.
In many areas, the BDI doesn’t just influence – it drives German politics. Meanwhile, it cements its lobbying relationship with (read: authority over) governments and state institutions it deems useful.
In a democracy, this raises serious questions about the BDI’s lobbying power vis-à-vis elected parliaments. The persistence of this imbalance is illustrated by the BDI’s push for deeper integration between industry and the military.
The BDI sees itself playing a central role in the militarization of Germany’s industry and economy – in a country that has already started two world wars.
Much of this is justified by the BDI’s neoliberal ideology of “less state, more free market.” Yet this very ideology blatantly contradicts the BDI’s lobbying for state-funded arms programs.
Corporate lobbying wants it both ways: preaching neoliberalism while cashing in on state subsidies for weapons.
In other words, while neoliberal ideology stands against the state, the practicalities of the military-industrial complex demand exactly the opposite. This is key: it remains the BDI’s job to smokescreen this all-too-obvious contradiction.
Meanwhile, the BDI’s history of fighting an – invented or otherwise – internal enemy stretches far back. As early as 1861, German tycoons founded an umbrella organization to represent capital vis-à-vis a state pressured to ease capitalism’s excesses.
This created a new contradiction. On one hand, companies were supposedly competing – tank manufacturer A vs. tank manufacturer B; gun-maker X vs. gun-maker Z.
But since the late 19th century, these “competitors” (read: cartels) banded together to extract state funds and suppress Germany’s early labour movement.
Even the BDI’s predecessors were plagued by contradictions: internal corporate conflicts and an anti-state, pro-free-market ideology paired with a dependency on state funding for arms.
Following the unification of Germany into the Deutsche Reich in 1871 and an economic crisis in 1873, pressure grew for state intervention in social and economic affairs. In response, company owners created the Central Association of German Industrialists in 1876.
By 1919, it became the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (RDI) – from its inception, dedicated to military-economic lobbying.
By October 1930, the RDI began aligning itself with the Nazi Party’s economic policies. By June 1933, it openly supported Hitler’s regime.
German industry was the main financier of German fascism. And it paid off: war, forced labour, and mass murder became instruments of profit maximization.
After the Allied victory, opinions diverged on what should replace the pro-Nazi RDI.
Just days after the founding of Germany’s Trade Union Confederation in 1949, a suddenly de-Nazified RDI resurfaced – encouraged by the Western Allies.
By early 1950, it became the BDI. Meanwhile, neoliberal ideology had already begun dominating economic thinking. Hayek’s simplistic pamphlet: The Road to Serfdom had appeared in 1944.
Armed with a digestible ideology, support from the Allies, and a sanitized Nazi past, the BDI began embedding itself in Germany’s new ministries, departments, and advisory bodies – shaping the post-Nazi state in its own image.
Evil heretics might – of course, wrongly and mistakenly – suggest that some BDI officials even “re-met” their old Nazi collaborators from just a few years earlier.
In the 1950s, the BDI shifted from German-style nationalism to a pro-Western orientation, joining EU-wide, bilateral, and multilateral economic bodies.
At home, this “Euro-networking” strengthened its grip on German ministries – while presenting itself as a European gateway. In reality, it lobbied for its own corporate interests, not the interests of the German people.
Because lobbying remains a dirty word, the BDI prefers to describe itself as a member organization of sectorial business associations.
Its military lobbying is decorously handled by a “Security Committee,” focused on defence (read: military), arms exports, and “economic affairs” (read: profits from arms).
Overall, the BDI continues to excel in shaping German government policy. In Brussels, Washington, and Beijing, BDI representatives speak for German capital.
Inside Germany, next to nothing in industrial policy happens without the BDI. The state-capital link is solid. Political scientists call this state capture.
At the EU level, the BDI remains extremely well-networked. Leveraging this, it demands that EU institutions – and Germany – recognize the “strategic importance” of the military.
Ensuring the military has access to financing is more than encouraged – it’s in the BDI’s DNA. Historically, four key factors shape the BDI’s role in Germany’s military-industrial complex:
- Anti-Communism: During the Cold War, a staunch anti-communist stance – showcasing Western capitalism’s superiority over East Germany and Eastern Europe.
- Europe: A commitment to European unity – not just for reunification, but to secure export markets for German goods, arms, and cooperation.
- France: A shift away from reactionary politics – most notably, accepting France as a partner, not an enemy.
- USA: A persistent interest in strong ties with the U.S. – first to fight Soviet-style communism, now to contain China.
The BDI has always been useful in the West’s Cold War against the USSR. Ironically, the BDI even criticized the Marshall Plan and the EU for not sufficiently meeting the military-industrial complex’s needs.
Today, the BDI actively supports Germany’s major military contractors:
- Rheinmetall, Hensoldt, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, Diehl Defence, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), MBDA, Rohde & Schwarz, Heckler & Koch, Airbus Defence and Space, and ESG Elektroniksystem- und Logistik GmbH.
Much of the BDI’s post-war lobbying began with its 1952 Working Group on Armaments Issues. Germany’s rearmament was an integral and high-priority policy.
In 1955, Germany joined NATO. In 1957, the post-war Ministry of Defence was founded. A decade later, the BDI joined the euphemistically labelled: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrtechnik (DWT) – another arms lobby.
By 2021, NATO’s military spending outpaced Russia’s by a factor of nearly 20.
In 2024, the BDI adopted the management buzzword resilience – now a euphemism for readiness for war. This “resilience economy” demands what the BDI calls financial honesty.
Translated: in addition to the already bloated special fund, Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, needs at least another €100 billion between 2025 and 2028.
Forget free-market ideology – when state money flows, neoliberals are suddenly Keynesians.
These funds are of great interest to the BDI: they secure profits for its member companies – and power for the BDI itself. In the wake of the war against the Ukraine, the BDI pushes for military-focused production and technology.
For over 150 years, the BDI has been a driving force in shaping Germany’s state-capital relationship and military-industrial complex.
Because arms production generates handsome surplus value for capital owners (read: while others die), the BDI continues to play a decisive role in Germany’s militarization.
Photo: (source)
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