Is the US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan deal truly a stepping stone towards just and lasting peace in the region 

We are well two weeks into what US President Trump named the age of peace, security, and friendship for the region of South Caucasus, following the trilateral summit he held in Washington on August 8 together with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan. The purpose of this high-level meeting was to revive the normalization process between the two rivalling countries, and to solidify US’s role as the main external political and economic partner in the course of achieving peace and unblocking regional connectivity.

While all eyes quickly reverted to Trump’s efforts to mediate Ukraine-Russia negotiations — even though they were hardly focused on Armenia and Azerbaijan to begin with, as evident from the media questions following the White House Ceremony — let us go over the parameters of this historic breakthrough, how the reached agreements resonate with other regional actors, and most importantly what do these freshly formalized commitments mean for the war affected people of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the displaced population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Is the peace deal really a peace deal? 

The outcome of the Washington summit, was dubbed, both by the White House official and by international media,  as “signing of a peace agreement and the end of the over three decades lasting conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan”. The caption peace deal, however, is an inaccurate description of the documents produced at the summit. Moreover, prematurely lauding the accomplishment of a peace agreement bears a risk of unwarranted aggravation among Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, for whom learning to live alongside in peace will be a long and challenging task that will require much more than reinstating interstate relationships. Over thirty years of conflict, two wars and numerous clashes have taken their toll of thousands of dead, injured and uprooted from their homes and communities. Processing this collective trauma, overcoming the enmity that has been accumulating for generations, and calming the anxiety that the next major escalation can erupt at any given moment cannot be forced by leaders shaking hands and proclaiming peace. 

If not a peace deal per se, then what exactly was achieved in Washington? Under Trump’s facilitation and months of preceding diplomatic efforts by the US, Pashinyan and Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration, which stipulates several concrete points that will serve as the blueprint for the next phase of negotiations. Although this declaration doesn’t carve the peace agreement in stone, it is undeniably a huge step forward towards tangible and actionable progress in the negotiations that were stalling in the past year. Most importantly, Aliyev and Pashinyan agreed upon a framework of the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia. The latest draft of this agreement was published by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs shortly after the Washington Summit. The scope of the agreement has been in the works bilaterally for almost two years, with several previous versions bouncing back, most notably due to Aliyev’s demand for constitutional reform in Armenia as a precondition for the peace agreement. The version referred to in the joint declaration reportedly has been advanced thanks to the increased engagement of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, following intelligence reports about Azerbaijan’s plans to renew hostilities at the border combined with incursions into Armenia’s southern region Syunik. 

Speaking of Syunik, the second key element of the deal is the agreement to grant the US exclusive rights for the duration of 99 years to develop the strategic transit route, humbly called “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” or TRIPP. This road, that cuts through Syunik province bordering with Iran, will connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichivan. Having this connection built and operating will be a great economic benefit for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as for Türkiye. However, the status of this route has been a major source of tension since the November 9 Agreement that ended the war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, when Azerbaijan promptly started invoking the narrative of Zangezur corridor. 

The rhetoric was highly problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the use of corridor implies extraterritoriality, which, coupled with Azerbaijan’s demand that security and customs control should not be exercised by Armenia but by a third party (most likely by Russia), was considered a direct threat to Armenia’s sovereignty. Second, referring to the toponym Zangezur the project alluded to the popular in Azerbaijan view that Armenian territories are in fact historical Azerbaijani lands. This particular choice of words, alongside the unresolved issue of Azerbaijani troops, occupying sovereign Armenian territory, fuelled the fear that annexation of Syunik may be in the cards. Expectedly,  against the backdrop of the Zangezur corridor rhetoric, the greenlight for TRIPP raises ambiguous reactions. 

With a healthy dose of scepticism, we are yet to see what will be the (geo-)political, economic, and social impact of the prospect of increased US presence in Armenia’s south. Nevertheless, the positive outcome of launching the TRIPP connectivity project is that it’s a clear and definitive pushback against the idea of extraterritorial corridor. Additionally, from a political perspective, scholar Anna Ohanyan suggests that this reverse approach to peace agreement – peace process nested in a development project with clear economic benefits for all involved parties, instead of a peace agreement that is designed to trickle-down economic cooperation and regional integration, may prove to be a more sustainable strategy for the region in the long-term. 

The third key element, is the joint appeal for the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, which in the 90s was appointed responsible to steer the conflict-resolution process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, in the past decade the Minsk Group and its structures have achieved little in its mandate, and gradually became only nominally a factor in the multiple tracks of peace negotiations, with its popularity and recognition sinking. On several occasions, Aliyev has called for the Minsk Group’s dissolution, which was generally accepted by Armenian leadership. The final formalization of this request with the Washington accord can be interpreted as a symbolic nod of appreciation towards the role of the US in the peace process. 

President of Peace and the role of the US 

Given the fact that the joint declaration is not legally binding, there is a legitimate concern about how strong these commitments will hold and when to expect a clear timeline of the remaining steps towards finalizing the peace agreement. During the broadcast from Washington, President Trump has vouched that he will personally follow through with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts and will be available to continue mediation in case any obstacles arise. However, we should consider that there are two elements of Washington’s involvement in this stage of the peace process. 

On the one hand, there’s Trump’s apparent political self-interest to score one more peace deal as the President of Peace, part of his unorthodox political campaign to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Considering how quickly Trump’s priorities may shift, and his interest piqued elsewhere, it is a gamble to rely on the promise of his personal involvement. It remains to be seen what will be the fruits of his other peacemaking efforts, as grounds for possible further commitments following up this summit. 

On the other hand, there’s also the aspect of Trump’s administration showing interest to firm its position in the region. Alongside the trilateral agenda, there were also bilateral meetings with favourable outcomes for both Armenia and Azerbaijan in terms of signing strategic memoranda of understanding. Aliyev seized the chance to advance Azerbaijan’s relationship with the US, including managing to negotiate lifting of the restriction on defence cooperation between Azerbaijan and US. While for Armenia, it was a positive sign that the US remains on track with advancing the strategic partnership agenda in multiple areas.

In the intersection of these two aspects, several questions call for answers in order to disperse some of the reservations regarding securing long-term commitment to the normalization process. On a practical level, there is the matter of timely implementation of the TRIPP connectivity project and which company will be selected to develop the transit route? Second, it is crucial to see who in Washington will take over the Armenia-Azerbaijan file, now that the conflict is rendered resolved. And lastly, what is to be done to prevent Azerbaijan’s renewed withdrawal from the negotiations?

Russia, Türkiye and Iran 

The joint declaration, more so the launch of the TRIPP route rather than the initiation of the peace agreement, bears major implications for the three big regional powers – Russia, Türkiye and Iran. The success of this format jeopardizes even more Russia’s dwindling influence in the two countries. Following the inaction of Russian peacekeepers during the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade and their indirect contribution to the military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the exodus of the entire population of Karabakh-Armenians, Armenia has steadily been distancing itself from Russia. 

In reverse, during that same period, there was growing evidence of proximity and mutual interest between Russia and Azerbaijan, as they have often presented aligning positions on regional matters. However, the two allies have been going through a rough patch this year. Tensions started with the Azeri passenger plane crash, for which Baku blames Moscow. During the summer, tensions continued rising with mass incarcerations of Azerbaijani citizens in Russia, and Russian citizens in Azerbaijan. This gradual straining of their relationship culminated with Russia striking SOCAR’s oil facilities during targeted attacks in Ukraine right before the Washington Summit. Is Azerbaijan’s willingness to commit to the US-facilitated deal a sign of a permanent drift from Russia, it is hard to say. But going forward with the plan for TRIPP puts Russia in a disadvantaged position. After years of supporting the idea of Zangezur corridor, with the aim that FSB will be mandated to exercise exclusive security and customs control over the stretch, this new development that will ultimately enhance US-Armenia relations and will likely drive Russia further away is a heavy blow.

For the other historically close ally to Azerbaijan, Türkiye, this turn of events is far more favourable. Having an operating transit route between Azerbaijan and Nakhichivan via Armenia means that they will be able to bypass the alternative project in development that goes through Iran. In addition, progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be considered as progress for the normalization process and the unblocking of the border between Armenia and Türkiye as well. Despite the continuous efforts to logistically and technically equip Armenia-Türkiye border crossing for opening, Erdogan has set the peace agreement with Azerbaijan as a precondition for unblocking the border. Should the Washington Declaration maintain momentum, this may be a great opportunity for boosting trade and economic integration not only for Armenia but for the entire region. 

Undoubtedly, the declaration bears the most ambiguous implications for Iran. For years, Iran was opposing the Zangezur rhetoric by firmly defending the position that it will not accept any territorial changes in the region. Although the TRIPP connectivity project is presented precisely as a guarantee to prevent territorial and sovereignty encroachments into Armenia, the prospect of heightened US presence so close to the Armenian-Iranian border was expected to spoil the relationship between Armenia and Iran. 

An interesting detail in the information coverage immediately after the Washington meeting, was that both Armenian and Iranian media and Telegram channels were flooded with articles recounting a statement made by Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, where he expressed concern that this project threatens the security of the region. This story quickly reverberated in international media. However, there is a slight contradiction between this media narrative and what followed diplomatically. 

On August 19, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian commenced his official visit to Armenia and assessing by the outcome of how it went, Iran is much less furious than depicted in the media. Pezeshkian and Pashinyan signed several important accords for cooperation, and discussed the prospect of bringing Armenian-Iran bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. Moreover, during the press conference, Iranian President reaffirmed that Iran supports the advancement towards peace. To what extent, this is diplomatic talk and if there’s any truth in the reactions that are still circulating online, remains to be seen as TRIPP’s implementation kicks off.

Beyond the geopolitical 

As the coverage of this event is mainly focused on the geopolitical aftermath of this event, it is critical to look beyond the geopolitical and zoom into the reactions of the people, for whom this peace is intended. If not necessarily stability, this document surely creates some breathing room and postpones the possibility of a new war. In view of the exaggerated reporting on the summit, the signing of this declaration, albeit important, is perceived as rather anticlimactic. Media polls following the Washington Summit show that in both countries, reactions are mixed. 

In Armenia, reactions oscillate between relief and caution. The public responses and interpretations follow the already existing patterns of polarization between pro-government and opposition factions in the society, easily traceable in the coverage in Armenian media. It is once again a responsibility of the government to ensure effective communication that will address the fears and doubts that people have. This time, the government has much more skin in the game, considering that in 2026 there will be general elections. 

While in Azerbaijan reactions seem more straightforward, this breakthrough in the peace process begs the question, if the normalization process keeps up with this pace, will there be space for genuine peacebuilding efforts from below? After systemic oppression against pro-peace voices and the political arrests of peace activists – most recently the 15-year sentence of researcher and activist Bahruz Samadov on charges of treason – how will this state-led peace unfold, if the most vocal advocates have been already silenced or fear for their safety and freedom?

With all this in mind, there is a third party, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, whose interests and grievances are largely erased from the post-summit conversation. During the ceremony in Washington, the question about Karabakh-Armenians’ right to return was quickly brushed off with friendly banter about Trump’s Nobel Prize nomination. Later, in a live-broadcasted assessment of the US-brokered agreements, Pashinyan noted that the question of the right to return may be harmful for the future of the peace agreement. In response to the declaration and likely Pashinyan’s remarks too, Nagorno-Karabakh representatives have submitted an appeal to the OSCE to halt the dissolution of the Minsk Group, since this will be another instance of making decisions without involving all concerned parties. 

The more you look into it, the more fragile this definitive peace deal gets. There are still too many unknown variables into how and with whose support the points in the agreement will start materializing.

Photo: (left to right) The president of Azerbaidjan Ilham Aliyev, the president of the USA Donald Trump and the prime minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan (Source: The White House)

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