The European security architecture between Putin’s revisionism and Trump’s unpredictability
A Bulgarian perspective on changes in international relations and security in Europe
Dr. Plamen Dimitrov, Bulgarian Geopolitical Society, April 15, 2025
This statement was made on April 15, 2025, at a joint event with students majoring in International Relations at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski. The transcript was provided to Cross-border Talks by its author. For several decades, European security was guaranteed by NATO.
For several decades, European security was guaranteed by NATO. During the Cold War, the US was strongly committed to the defense of its allies in Europe and deployed troops on the Old Continent that were ready to repel any attack by the Soviet Union. Until the end of the 1980s, territorial defense was the priority. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the threat of a conventional attack from the East diminished significantly. Investment in the armies of European countries also declined.
In the years following the end of the Cold War, the dominant concept of US and European foreign policy was liberalism, also known as liberal internationalism. Liberalism is based on the assumption that a peaceful world order is possible. It can be achieved through international cooperation, as the threat of force is not the most effective means of realizing the national interests of states. Liberalism relies on international institutions. It rejects the division of the world into spheres of influence between great powers and affirms the right of smaller states to geopolitical self-determination. Of course, the US and the EU rely on this democratic self-determination being to the West’s advantage.
Liberalism also gave rise to the theory of democratic peace. It posits that democracies do not wage war against each other, which means that if all large and powerful countries in the world were democracies, this would ensure peace. Practice shows that since World War II, democracies have indeed not waged war against each other, but not all great powers are democracies. In principle, this concept of international politics only works if the countries that adhere to it have clear military and political superiority and dominate the international system. And until the beginning of 2025, this was the case. The global supremacy of democratic states was guaranteed mainly by the military power of the United States.
The end of the relatively carefree years for European security came with the strengthening of Russia’s economic power and geopolitical self-confidence. During his third and fourth presidential terms, Vladimir Putin has pursued a revisionist foreign policy, with Ukraine as its main target. At the same time, the Kremlin is seeking to reshape the European security architecture so that Russia is included as an important factor that must be taken into account by all. In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, then provoked and supported, financially and militarily, a separatist uprising in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
Russia’s next attack on the European security system came at the end of 2021. On December 17, Moscow published draft agreements with the US and NATO demanding a halt to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the east. In addition, Russia demanded that NATO withdraw all troops deployed in Eastern Europe since May 1997. This ultimatum was naturally rejected by NATO, after which Russia launched a full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
The aggression against Ukraine was also a blow to the principle of liberal internationalism in international relations. This was one of the reasons why the US and the EU reacted sharply and took sides in the conflict, actively helping Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions on Russia. Between February 24, 2022, and January 20, 2025, European NATO countries and the US acted in sync in terms of aid to Kyiv. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic had the same geopolitical reading of the war. This changed with the start of Donald Trump’s second term as president. Trump and key figures in his team reject liberal internationalism and view the world through the prism of realist theory of international order.
In order to save resources, the new administration in Washington is turning to the former practice of dividing the world into spheres of influence. This means that Donald Trump is inclined to partially satisfy Russia’s revisionist ambitions, as it does not pose an existential threat to the US. Overall, however, the future foreign policy moves of the US president remain difficult to predict. The general opinion is that he is an impulsive politician who very often views inter-state relations through the prism of his personal attitude toward the respective state leader with whom he is negotiating.
In the new situation, EU countries remain committed to liberal internationalism, but can no longer rely on US military power to enforce it. Therefore, if they want to defend their principles on the international stage and in particular on the Old Continent, European countries must acquire greater military power. In the new situation, NATO remains a pillar of European security, albeit a shaky one. At least for now, there are no indications that the US will leave the North Atlantic Treaty. Even if Trump wanted to, it would not be so easy, because such a decision would have to be confirmed by Congress in Washington. The concerns are more in another direction – that by remaining formally in NATO, the US under Donald Trump’s leadership may refuse to help in the event of a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a European country.
Europe now has two main tasks in terms of defense and security – short-term and medium-term. First, to help Ukraine defend itself in the face of halted US military aid. Second, to ensure its own security in the face of Russian aggression, which is likely to continue regardless of the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
By early 2025, a consensus had emerged in the European Union that European countries’ defense spending should be increased. At the end of March 2025, the European Commission published a “White Paper on European Defense – Preparedness by 2030.” It presents a vision for the rearmament of Europe. The objectives are for the European defense industry to be able to produce the necessary weapons with the required speed and in the required quantities, and for troops and military equipment to be deployed quickly throughout the European Union.
The European Commission’s plan provides for an additional €800 billion to be allocated to the defense and security of EU countries over the next four years. Up to €150 billion will be borrowed by the European Commission on favorable terms and then allocated to joint defense projects by groups of member states. In addition, EU countries will be able to spend an additional 1.5% of their GDP on military purposes, and this expenditure will not be included in the calculation of the budget deficit, which according to EU rules cannot exceed 3% of GDP. According to European Commission estimates, this will free up an additional €650 billion in fiscal space over a four-year period. The €150 billion loan will be allocated by the European Commission only to projects involving the purchase of arms and equipment from EU-based companies. At the same time, at least two-thirds of the content of these products must originate in the EU. In addition, the European Investment Bank will be allowed to finance security and defense projects, which it has not been allowed to do until now.
Military spending by European countries rose by 31% between 2021 and 2024, reaching €326 billion per year. The increase will continue in the coming years, but the ceiling of €800 billion in additional funds set by the European Commission is unlikely to be reached. The reason is that some southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain, are heavily indebted and fear that borrowing for defense will exacerbate the debt crisis they are in. Moreover, these countries are far from Russia and therefore do not feel directly threatened by possible aggression from Moscow. At the end of April 2025, it became clear that 16 EU countries had requested the activation of the budgetary derogation clause in order to increase military spending: Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland. It is striking that France, which is the leading military power in the EU but also has a high level of public debt (115% of GDP) and a budget deficit (5.4% for 2025), is not among them.
It is wrong to think that the increase in defense spending in EU countries will be directed solely towards the purchase of weapons and equipment. Defense budgets are spent in four areas: personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement of weapons, and defense infrastructure. Data for NATO countries show that, on average, the first three items are roughly equal as a share of military budgets. In 2024, for example, 43% of US military spending will be on operations and maintenance and only 25% on weapons procurement. Data for the same year from European NATO allies show that only five countries spend more than 40% of their military budgets on arms purchases: Poland, Hungary, Albania, Finland, and Luxembourg. In reality, no more than half of the additional defense spending that EU countries will incur in the four years after 2025 will be spent on the arms market. A significant portion of the funds will be directed toward increasing the number of military personnel and their salaries. This expenditure will become even more significant if there is a full or partial withdrawal of US troops from Europe, which by 2025 will number between 75,000 and 105,000. US military personnel will then have to be replaced by European soldiers and officers.
By spring 2025, European countries will be looking for the most appropriate format for providing military assistance to Ukraine and for the possible deployment of military forces on Ukrainian territory if and when a ceasefire is signed between Kyiv and Moscow. Due to objections from Hungary and, to some extent, Slovakia, no consensus can be reached on this issue within the EU. Flexible formats are therefore being sought. Under the leadership of the UK and France, the so-called Coalition of the Willing was formed in March 2025. It includes most EU countries, but also non-European powers such as Canada, Australia, and Japan. Within a month, this coalition held three meetings, hosted by British Prime Minister Starmer and French President Macron. Subsequently, however, doubts arose as to whether European countries would be able to send a sufficiently large peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. The fact remains, however, that the UK is establishing itself as an important element of the European security architecture, regardless of the British decision to leave the EU.
Europe’s military assistance to Kyiv will continue to be provided on a bilateral basis, with the UK and France once again taking the lead, along with Germany, whose new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is a strong supporter of Ukraine.
As for the security of the European Union itself, it should be noted that there is a clause in primary EU law that is analogous to the famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is Article 42, paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty), which states that when a member state of the EU is the victim of an armed attack, the other member states must assist it with all the means at their disposal. The problem is that the European Union does not have a unified military command and mechanism for coordinating efforts in the event of war. Since the end of 2024, the EU has had a Commissioner for Defense and Space, former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius. However, he is more of a minister of the EU’s military industry than a minister of defense, which remains the competence of the national governments of the member states. At least for now, there are no prospects for security and defense to become part of the first pillar of European integration; they will remain a matter of intergovernmental policy.
In conclusion, we should note that under the influence of Russia’s aggression and the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump, the European security architecture has begun to shift towards greater autonomy for the EU from Washington. Another important trend is the increasingly rapid growth of military spending by European countries. However, it is unclear how far these trends will go. If, after the end of Trump’s term, the US returns to its previous foreign policy course and reaffirms its alliance with Europe, this will bring calm to the Old Continent and slow down the pace of rearmament.
Photo: Krakow (source: Pixabay, CC0)
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