East-Germany’s youth

Posted by Thomas Klikauer

For many young people in East-Germany, democracy has become a dirty word. It is conceivable that an entire generation might be lost to the far-right.

The former SPD politician Karamba Diaby, from East-Germany’s Halle (an der Saale), was the first African-born Black member of the Bundestag – Germany’s parliament. In East-Germany, he was attacked multiple times by neo-Nazis. He no longer stands for election.

Unlike others who fear neo-Nazi reprisals and far-right online abuse, Diaby still speaks publicly without using a pseudonym.

Many politicians and elected officials in East-Germany do not use their real names. They avoid using their names in order to evade the brutal might of neo-Nazis and the vitriol poured out in East-German hate speech, often expressed anonymously within far-right social media echo chambers and filter bubbles.

Meanwhile, far-right and neo-Nazi crimes have increased massively in the past year. East Germany’s neo-Nazis continue to grow in number. Far-right terrorist groups are regularly arrested, and their networks are being banned by the state.

Those who regularly visit schools, conduct workshops, and give book readings in East Germany have observed – particularly in recent years – that children and young people are beginning to “look the same” again.

Their dress code mirrors the 1990s – the so-called baseball-bat years, marked by brutal neo-Nazi violence using sports equipment to attack virtually anyone who didn’t look “German enough,” or anyone seen as an enemy of the neo-Nazi hallucination known as the Volksgemeinschaft.

Some of those 1990s baseball-bat brandishing neo-Nazis now likely have children who are filling the ranks of today’s second generation of neo-Nazis – a grim recurrence of the years following reunification in 1990.

They, too, have shaved heads and wear bomber jackets – just like their far-right fathers once did. At first, this seemed absurd, especially as right-wing extremists had increasingly adopted petty-bourgeois attire during the 2010s. That camouflage was highly effective. But now, it seems, such disguises are no longer considered necessary.

One reason for the return to overt neo-Nazi fashion might be its ability to radiate dominance. As a result, young people in East Germany sometimes find Nazism and racism not only acceptable – but popular, even “extremely funny.”

There was even a recent case at an East German school where an eighth-grader stood in the locker room reciting Hitler’s campaign speeches – tellingly, no one said anything.

And then, there are the old symbols. Swastikas carved into school desks. The number “88” casually written on walls or desks during, for example, a chemistry lesson. (88 = HH = Heil Hitler, as H is the 8th letter of the alphabet.)

None of this is disconnected from wider politics – especially the rise of the neo-fascist AfD, particularly in East-Germany. In the state of Saxony-Anhalt, where elections are due next year, support for the AfD currently sits at 39%.

Experiencing racism on the street – even physical violence – is not unusual. It’s not confined to the internet.

Hatred and incitement against anyone perceived as “the enemy” has increased dramatically. Many elected officials receive daily emails filled with threats and insults.

It’s become so overwhelming that some can no longer keep up with deleting the daily flood of hate mail. Physical violence has also occurred. In 2020, one official’s office was shot at. In 2023, it was completely burned down in an arson attack.

Others have received death threats. Worse still, much of this has become part of everyday life for elected representatives of democratic parties.

Some have left the Bundestag altogether – and stopped posting on social media. For many, disappearing from public life was the only way to end the hate.

Back in Berlin, Brandenburg, and the coastal town of Rostock, people deemed “enemies” by neo-Nazis were once chased through the streets during the 1990s. Now, this is returning.

East-Germans who stand for democracy no longer feel safe in public spaces. The general impression today is that right-wing extremism is resurging – seen in the Nazi stickers plastered everywhere, even on beaches in East German tourist towns.

And there’s a certain pride that many young neo-Nazis now carry. People who have worked in political education over the past 15 years are noticing the shift.

Ten years ago, young East-Germans might say, “I’m not a racist, but…” – usually followed by a clearly racist statement. Today, they’re more likely to say: “Yes, I’m a Nazi – and that’s a good thing!”

People who speak publicly about this no longer want their real names used. They rely on pseudonyms. This (un)culture of fear is spreading.

Even social workers know: youth work in East-Germany is under extreme pressure. When the neo-fascist AfD gains influence in local politics, democracy-strengthening programs face budget cuts – or are eliminated altogether.

As a rule, this kind of educational work is rarely funded long-term. It’s project-based. Social workers must move from one project to the next, depending on public funding and the support of cooperative partners.

At the same time, the AfD demands strict “political neutrality” – a preferred ideological tool to shut down pro-democracy initiatives.

This so-called “neutrality” is being weaponized by the AfD in its fight against democratic education. But the neutrality requirement the AfD promotes does not legally exist in Germany. What is being sold as “protecting democracy” is, in fact, an attack on democracy itself.

Citing “neutrality” has become a common tactic of Germany’s far right in recent years. In particular, East-Germany’s far-right – the neo-fascist AfD and adjacent Neo-Nazis – are playing the game of political neutrality to undermine democracy.

The AfD claims that schools must remain “neutral,” arguing that teachers should no longer express political views. This is how the far right in East-Germany, led by the AfD, seeks to suppress any form of democratic education – in schools and beyond.

In reality, schools are inherently political spaces – no politics, no schools. This isn’t new. Historically, education in Germany came with the Enlightenment, often against the resistance of conservatives. The very introduction of basic schooling in the 19th and 20th centuries was a political act – an act of Enlightenment.

Despite the AfD’s relentless attacks on education, political education is never neutral. Instead of the falsely claimed “neutrality” pushed by the AfD, Germany’s political education is grounded in the Beutelsbach Consensus.

It states that children and young people should be empowered to analyze and shape political situations — to formulate “their own interests.” That is a core value of democracy.

Based on this principle, many East-German social workers take a clear stance against the AfD. Yet democracy projects in East-Germany live in constant fear of funding cuts.

Both the manufactured demand for “neutrality” and the threat of defunding support a broader shift to the right in East-Germany. 

The influence of the AfD is already evident in the fact that social workers involved in pro-democracy projects often feel unable to speak publicly under their real names.

Yet these social workers play a crucial role in defending democracy in East-Germany. Rather than fighting against political education that promotes democracy, it should have been firmly anchored in East-Germany’s school system – ever since the 1990s.

But it seems little was learned from the 1990s, despite those years being marked by horror: Neo-Nazi riots against migrants, numerous racist murders. 

The wave of violence lasted through the decade – aside from East-Germany’s most brutal Neo-Nazi terror network: the NSU (1998–2011).

After a brief period of relative calm – perhaps ten years – institutions supporting democracy in East-Germany are now witnessing a steady resurgence of racism, right-wing extremism, and Neo-Nazism.

East-Germany is not yet experiencing the daily brutalities of the 1990s. Still, many East-German schools today lack pro-democracy education – because they lack teachers.

And it is precisely this democratic education – where students can exchange ideas – that is missing in East-Germany.

Even worse, there’s also a lack of political education specialists. Unsurprisingly, this has been accompanied by a rise in far-right sympathies.

More broadly, what’s occurring among East-German youth is a kind of atmospheric change – a speechlessness. Teachers report that students no longer argue, debate, or discuss. What remains is a bizarre idea of “neutrality” that masks a deep assault on democracy.

You cannot be neutral toward fascism or Neo-Nazi violence – but that is exactly what the AfD demands.

Meanwhile, old Nazis (1930s–1945) and young Neo-Nazis (since the 1990s) are increasingly seen as “cool.” Among East-Germany’s youth, this is partly because the AfD, Neo-Nazis, and far-right extremists command online platforms far more effectively than pro-democracy forces.

The internet is not a neutral space either. It is the central space where young people are radicalised – toward the far right and Neo-Nazism.

And that’s where the AfD sets the tone. Its dominance on forums, chat rooms, TikTok, and elsewhere plays a crucial role.

Recently, educators in East-Germany noticed that young people were already familiar with the far-right American influencer Charlie Kirk – long before his attempted assassination made him known to the broader public.

That surprised many. Educators follow the news closely, yet they increasingly realize they live in a completely different world than their students – one outside the algorithmic echo chambers shaping youth.

Today, many adults in East-Germany are alarmed at the far-right radicalisation of society. This fear is constantly stoked by the AfD.

Worse still, radicalised children and young people are now doing what many adults do not dare: launching politically motivated attacks against migrants, institutions, and democracy itself.

In one programme – Schülis gegen Rechts (Schoolkids Against the Radical Right) – a 12-year-old opened a session in desperation. Far-right classmates had bullied and threatened him with violence.

Why? He had written “Fuck AfD” on his exercise book. He may have been the only one in the classroom openly opposing racism. He reported the threats to his teachers – and the situation escalated.

In the end, the headmaster reprimanded him – on the grounds that school must be apolitical. “Fuck AfD,” he was told, “has no place here.”

The far-right students who threatened him with beatings? No consequences. This is just one example of how Neo-Nazism is growing in East-Germany.

Pro-democracy social workers regularly witness students giving the Hitler salute. When asked why, they often say they copied it from classmates or older siblings – though they cannot explain its meaning. This is where youth work intervenes.

It’s not uncommon to find 13-year-olds in classrooms saying things like: “The Auschwitz thing – it wasn’t that bad. They all worked there voluntarily. And if they were killed, then probably because they didn’t work well.” But Holocaust denial is a criminal offense in Germany.

The democracy work being done in East-German schools is vital. If these programmes fail to reach students, then both the programmes – and East-Germany itself – have failed.

Democracy must be continuously supported – and that requires continuous investment. The current situation is alarming.

In 2024, German police registered – 42,788 right-wing extremist crimes – a 48% increase over the previous year.

Violent right-wing crimes rose to 1,488 — up 17%. Counseling centers know that many such crimes go unreported. East-Germany has both more right-wing extremists and more people willing to commit violence.

Germany’s domestic intelligence agency – the Office for the Protection of the Constitution – reported a sharp increase in such extremists in 2024: from 40,600 to 50,250. Around 25,000 of them are organized in political parties like Neo-Nazi mini-parties and the AfD.

15,300 of these individuals are classified as “extremely violent” – up from 14,500 in the previous year. It’s not unreasonable to assume that many of them vote – if they vote at all – for the AfD.

The AfD remains especially popular among young voters. In Germany’s February 2025 election, 21% of 18-to-24-year-olds supported the AfD – 14% of women, 27% of men. That’s nearly a 15% gain since 2021.

The respected Shell Youth Study found in 2024 that 25% of boys and young men (ages 12–25) identified as right-wing – up from under 20% in 2019. Among girls and young women, it was 11%.

Meanwhile, 55% of young people described themselves as politically interested – significantly higher than in the 1990s or 2000s.

The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study offers further insight: in 2024, only 29.7% of East-Germans said they were satisfied with democracy – compared to 45.5% in the West.

Almost half of East-Germans agreed with the statement: “Foreigners come only to take advantage of our welfare state” (West: 33.2%).

The Shell Youth Study shows 75% of youth overall are satisfied with democracy — but there’s a stark gap: 60% in the East, 77% in the West. In the East, that number has fallen steadily since 2019.

According to the Leipzig study, 44.3% of East-Germans fully agreed with the statement: “Germany is overrun by foreigners to a dangerous extent” (West: 31.1%).

How youth are politically educated varies greatly by age. For 14-to-24-year-olds, almost 60% get their information primarily from online platforms – more than double the rate in older generations.

In many far-right echo chambers, democracy has become a dirty word – like gay, Jewish, or queer. Antisemitism is never far behind.

At the same time, the manosphere – a network of misogynistic online spaces – has taken root among East-German youth. Misogyny is spreading in ways previously unseen.

The impression is growing: an entire generation is being lost to the far right. Some even say: “We’ll be lucky if it’s only one generation.”

Time is not on democracy’s side. Worse: anti-fascism is increasingly criminalised – not just in Trump’s America, but also in Europe. It’s not fascism that’s being targeted, but anti-fascism.

The danger is real. Whether this generation is lost depends on how German society responds – and whether democratic parties and civil society can offer real alternatives. Young people need recognition and participation.

Right-wing extremism does not become strong on its own – it grows where democratic alternatives are absent. Ultimately, this generation of East-German youth is not lost.

But East-German society is offering few attractive alternatives for young people. This leaves the field open to neo-Nazis. Right-wing extremists step in precisely where democratic society leaves a vacuum.

The situation is alarming. Yet, to speak of a “lost” generation would imply that nothing can be done – and that’s simply not true.

Take, for example, the East-German constituency of Bautzen I, where a climate change denier and former VoPo officer — who believes democratic parties are a bunch of pedophiles, communists, and Maoists inviting “knife-carrying hordes” [Messerhorden] – was elected with a staggering 48.3% of the vote. And still, democrats remain the majority in East-Germany – for now.

Historically, on November 6, 1932, “only” 34% voted for Hitler’s Nazi party in the Dresden-Bautzen electorate. Today, the neo-fascist AfD has received 14.3% more support than Hitler’s Nazis did in 1932. So, have Germans really learned from history when today’s neo-Nazis outpoll Hitler’s party?

Then as now, it’s more important than ever that many more people take a stand for democracy.

Neo-Nazism, racism, and right-wing extremism must be opposed – at work, at football, and at grandma’s eightieth birthday. Otherwise, an entire generation of East-German youth may indeed be lost.

Photo: East-German Neo-Nazis March in Dresden (source: public radio https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/rechtsextreme-jugendliche-baseballschlaegerjahre-100.html)

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