Ofer Neiman: In the context of stopping the genocide, ceasefire is a reasonable step. But that immediately brings us back to the privileged Israeli citizens must do to end the apartheid

I think the first phase will happen — it’s in Israel’s best interest since it means getting the surviving hostages back. The second phase, about disarming Hamas, is more complicated. We need to be precise about the wording here. I don’t see Hamas or other armed resistance groups actually giving up their weapons. Maybe they’ll store them somewhere safe or agree to a long-term ceasefire, called a hudna in Arabic. But that’s different from true disarmament. The real question is what Netanyahu will do when that moment comes. I think he’ll resist moving forward unless there’s some symbolic gesture, something ambiguous, like “storing weapons” rather than handing them over. There will be pressure to make progress, but I doubt the armed groups will truly disarm — says Ofer Neimar, an Israeli left activist involved in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. 

Interview by Wojciech Albert Łobodziński. The talk took place on the 9th of October.

Wojciech Albert Łobodziński: What was the reaction in the Israeli media on 9 October? Especially since, if I’m not mistaken, the government has already approved the agreement created by Donald Trump — how did people react?

Ofer Neimar: Liberal Zionists are celebrating. You’ll see them using words like peace process and all that nonsense. The right-wing, on the other hand, is furious. The mainstream media is trying to frame it as a reasonable, balanced agreement — somewhere between the liberal Zionist position and that of the right-wing, and they’re trying to emphasize the expected return of the remaining living captives.

And what about the far right? They basically hold the keys to power now, don’t they?

Yes, and they’re furious. Their line is that Israel has surrendered to Hamas and that Hamas will attack us again. They’re also frustrated because their vision of resettling the Gaza Strip — rebuilding the Jewish settlements there — is gone, at least for now.

Do you think they might attempt to sabotage the government over this?

It’s possible that the far-right parties will leave the coalition, but I don’t necessarily see them voting against the government in a no-confidence motion. They might step away formally, but Netanyahu will likely try to buy them off — promise them that there are more phases ahead, that he’ll find ways to undermine the deal, or offer them something else in return, maybe in the West Bank. This depends on signals from the Trump Administration: How interested are they in enforcing the agreement?

And what’s your own view on the ceasefire?

In the context of stopping the genocide, it’s a reasonable step. But that immediately brings us back to what we, as privileged Israeli citizens, must do — much more — to end Israel’s genocide and apartheid. Stopping a genocide is such a low bar. There’s so much more that needs to be done. So yes, I feel some relief, but not much beyond that because what lies ahead are new political challenges that we’ll have to confront. That’s what I’m focusing on now.

Do you think the framework itself is feasible? The first phase is about hostages, the second about Hamas disarming, and the last about Gaza being placed under some kind of non-elected administrative authority. What do you make of these stages?

I think the first phase will happen — it’s in Israel’s best interest since it means getting the surviving hostages back. The second phase, about disarming Hamas, is more complicated. We need to be precise about the wording here. I don’t see Hamas or other armed resistance groups actually giving up their weapons. Maybe they’ll store them somewhere safe or agree to a long-term ceasefire — what’s called a hudna in Arabic. But that’s different from true disarmament.

The real question is what Netanyahu will do when that moment comes. I think he’ll resist moving forward unless there’s some symbolic gesture — something ambiguous, like “storing weapons” rather than handing them over. There will be pressure to make progress, but I doubt the armed groups will truly disarm.

Do you think the pressure will come from inside Israel, or are you referring more to Donald Trump and other American politicians?

Liberal Zionists here are already saying that their own protests — their own people — were the ones who made this deal possible, which is a joke. That’s not the real reason. The real reason is that Israel has paid a heavy price — militarily, politically, and economically. And Trump, of course, had his own motives for pressuring Israel. Maybe he thinks this could earn him a Nobel Peace Prize.

So, the main pressure on Israel is external. Still, if Netanyahu goes back to war and continues the genocide, I think we’ll see stronger domestic opposition. How strong? Not very… I’m not impressed by mainstream Israeli protests. But I do think there will be more anger if the war resumes — and Netanyahu knows that. If he reignites the conflict, he risks losing even more political ground ahead of the elections.

He’s thinking about next year’s elections — which he’s unlikely to win. So if he goes back to war and genocide, that could only hurt him further. 

How would you describe Israeli society now, two years and two days after October 7? 

There’s been a real descent into barbarism here. Many people have shed even that thin layer of civility — the restraint from hate speech. You hear genocidal rhetoric everywhere, including from people who once considered themselves liberals. Even liberal Zionists are immersed in this we are the victims narrative. They look at global protests and complain, “Why are they boycotting us?”

There’s genuine trauma and exhaustion here — I acknowledge that. But trauma doesn’t justify crimes against Palestinians. People are tired, and many hope for something better, but they’re not ready to change the brutal reality of how Israel treats Palestinians.

Are there any strong or visible voices within Israel trying to acknowledge what has happened and engage with the world?

There are artists, writers, university professors, people in the high-tech sector who maintain personal or professional contact with colleagues abroad. But most still avoid using the term genocide. They prefer vague language that’s not particularly constructive. There are, however, a few liberal Zionists who are beginning to recognize the scale of what’s happening and are cautiously talking about genocide.

It’s interesting because globally, artists, athletes, and public figures are openly taking a stand. Support for Palestine has entered the mainstream in a way we haven’t seen before. Do you think Israel could eventually repeat the path of apartheid-era South Africa? 

We’re already hearing Israel’s supporters say that now people across the world need to stop protesting against Israel — because there’s supposedly a peace process. They keep using that phrase, trying to label us as haters if we continue to campaign for Palestinian rights. I hope the global solidarity movement continues and grows stronger. It must.

As for the far right — no, they won’t give up. But honestly, I’ve long believed that our biggest problem isn’t them. It’s the mainstream. The mainstream in Israel is genocidal and racist — it has empowered the far right for decades.

The real question is what the mainstream does next. If the mainstream finally decides that Israel must withdraw from the West Bank, the far right will become isolated — just like during the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, when a solid majority supported withdrawal and the far right couldn’t stop it.

Of course, the right wing, including most of Likud, Netanyahu’s party, will  keep pushing to expand settlements and apartheid in the West Bank. And things have gotten much worse since October 7 — now we see armed militias, wearing IDF uniform, terrorizing Palestinians. They won’t give up on their project.

That’s why our global campaign — especially the BDS movement — should now focus more on the West Bank. We need to base our advocacy on the information coming from there, while also continuing to demand accountability for Israel’s genocide in Gaza and complete withdrawal from Gaza, as well as the release of all Palestinian political prisoners, who should be labeled ‘catpives’. All of these issues matter, but I think Israeli crimes in the West Bank will become central to the next phase of our work.

What do you think could actually impact the Israeli mainstream? What might change their mindset — perhaps a shift in the U.S. government’s position? Or something else?

International pressure and isolation are crucial. The key factor, of course, would be the U.S. administration. A president openly critical of Israel would cause a political earthquake here. For now, we don’t have that. A change in Congress or in the Senate could also make a difference — support for more critical policies toward Israel is growing there, but not fast enough.

If, at some point, there’s a majority in favour of measures like suspending arms deliveries to Israel, that would also cause a political earthquake here. Beyond that, sanctions from Europe could matter — for example, banning Israel from cultural or sporting events such as the UEFA or Eurovision. That may be more difficult now, after the ceasefire, but there are legitimate reasons and growing support for it. So, I believe  the academic, sports, and cultural boycotts — essentially, the broader BDS movement — remain key.

Liberal Zionists seem eager to return to “business as usual” — portraying themselves as victims, blaming the Israeli right for crimes committed in Gaza, claiming they’re not racist, that they support peace with Palestinians. But I don’t think they’ll become real dissidents without external pressure. They’ll have to be isolated internationally, and otherwise nothing will change.

What do you think may happen next? Where might the next escalation occur? Some people here in Poland talk about a possible confrontation with Turkey — maybe not this year, but eventually. Personally, I doubt it. I think the next phase will be the West Bank. What’s your view?

Yes, Israel perceives Turkey as a strategic threat, an enemy even. But I don’t think there will be a war with Turkey anytime soon. Still, Israel seeks regional hegemony — and if you ask who stands in its way, the answer would be Iran and Turkey.

There’s definitely a perception among Israeli military and political elites that Turkey poses a threat, but for now the focus remains Gaza and the West Bank — and perhaps soon — another war with Iran. Israel is also still bombing Lebanon, trying to pressure Hezbollah into disarming. I don’t think they’ll succeed, but we’ll likely see more airstrikes in Lebanon and possibly new confrontations with Iran.

As for the West Bank, I expect escalating violence there — more settler militias and IDF forces terrorizing Palestinians, driving small communities in Area C from their land. It’s a crime against humanity, part of Israel’s strategy to seize that territory. Area C constitutes the majority of the West Bank, and since relatively few Palestinians live there, Israel wants to annex it.

We’re witnessing systematic ethnic cleansing in the Jordan Valley, South Hebron Hills, and around Jerusalem — settlers and the army working together to isolate and expel Palestinians. There’s clear footage of this. 

I hope people in Poland and around the world pay attention. And beyond that, construction continues: new roads, new settlements, settlers invading private Palestinian land and setting up outposts that later become official. We’ll see even more of that.

*Here is the full text of the Donald Trump’s agreement:

1. Gaza will be a deradicalised terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours.

2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.

3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.

4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.

5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after 7 October 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.

6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the 19 January 2025 agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under 19 January 2025 agreement.

9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform programme, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energise Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration programme all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbours.

14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.

15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.

17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.

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