Trump Card: How Nawrocki’s Presidency Reshapes Polish Politics
Polish presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Jasionka, Poland, May 27, 2025. (DHS photo by Tia Dufour)
Karol Nawrocki’s plan for presidency – a constructive confrontation, combined with building of his own position. A clear threat to the liberal government.
The energy with which Nawrocki delivered his first address before the Polish parliament, marked with a sense of power and authority resembling a character from an Antonio Scurati novel, could blow away, overshadow, or at least block the actions of the liberal coalition. Especially given that Donald Tusk and his team are currently mired in its own problems and suffering from palpable ineffectiveness.
Donald Tusk, a slayer of populism, a leader of European importance, and a self-proclaimed economic miracle worker, seems to be in a defensive, if not a political depression. Reactive, lacking fresh ideas, swerving to the right in failed bids to counter the far right, he doesn’t appear to be any match for Nawrocki, who has already scored several decisive points in his first days in office, weakening the prime minister’s position.
Will such a fratricidal struggle within the executive branch weaken Poland’s position in light of the current geopolitical situation? We have already found the answer to this question. Poland is already weakened.
The energy with which Nawrocki seized power on August 6 will go down in Poland’s history. From the morning hours, Warsaw’s city centre filled with crowds supporters of the new president and the Law and Justice, having come from the entire country.The media claimed that as many as 150,000 people arrived in the Polish capital, and I, having observed the situation on the ground, think there could have been many more. What’s more, it was not just the number of people that was impressive, but where they came from. Nawrocki was greeted in front of the parliament, and then in front of the Presidential Palace, by people from so-called Poland B: medium-sized cities, towns, and villages, especially from Eastern part of the country. Also, present were trade unionists, social, and religious organizations, or more broadly, the institutional and social right.
Where did this mobilization come from? It was the result of a narrative from part of the liberal coalition, or rather, from the words of people closest to Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who suggested that the election might have been fraudulent. Interestingly, the Speaker of the Sejm, the Polish equivalent of the Speaker of Parliament, Szymon Hołownia, responded to this narrative, saying that he had been urged to commit a “coup d’état,” that is – to delay or to obstruct the president’s inauguration. This comment, which was supposed to be a declaration of independence on the part of the smaller coalition partner, Poland 2050, led by Hołownia, only confirmed the fears of the right and of people who think beyond a single election cycle or toxic polarization, while also providing proof that the current coalition is unable to agree on anything.
Those gathered in Warsaw could listen to President Nawrocki’s words about the need for major infrastructural projects, such as the Central Communication Port, about a new constitution that the president intends to start working on, and about continuing the war over the judiciary with the liberal government. In addition, the president promised to lower the Value-Added Tax, combat the European Green Deal, fight for a stronger Polish position in the world, and create the largest land army on the continent.
Nawrocki did not read his speech – he learned it by heart. He spoke in a powerful voice of a (former?) football fanatic, and his words were a clear challenge to the weakened government.
Presidential Powers
Under Polish law, the president is the guardian of the Constitution. Among many other things, he can veto legislation—which then requires a 3/5 majority in the Sejm to be overridden—or refer a bill to the Constitutional Tribunal for review. Furthermore, he has the power of legislative initiative, which Nawrocki has announced his intention to use.
The president is also the commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces in peacetime and the supreme commander in time of war. He has the right to appoint commanders of the various armed services and to participate in meetings of the National Security Council. However, on this last point, he can count on cooperation with the Minister of National Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz, who is the leader of one of the four main coalition forces, the Polish People’s Party, the most right-wing party in the coalition.
Nevertheless, one of the most important powers in this configuration is the representation of Poland on the international stage. The president ratifies and denounces international agreements, appoints ambassadors, and receives letters of credence from representatives of other states. His decisions on this matter should be made with the approval of the Council of Ministers, but this is not always the case, especially when the president has a foreign patron more powerful than the government.
Trump Card
And Karol Nawrocki has such a patron, none other than Donald Trump. It was the invitation to the White House during the election campaign that gave fire and zeal to the previously rather unenergetic campaign of Karol Nawrocki, a newcomer to politics. Reportedly, the two men took a liking to each other, or if not, they at least understood their own interests, which we can already see. Using his constitutional powers and Trump’s support, Nawrocki, on August 13, barely a week after taking office, negotiated a meeting with the US president preceding the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska. And now he has announced a one-on-one visit to the White House with Trump for September 3.
But what happened to the meeting of European leaders after the Alaska summit, which took place on August 18? It seems that tensions between the prime minister’s chancellery and the president’s chancellery have escalated so much that Poland, now as a state and not a fiefdom belonging to one of the two right-wing factions, Kaczyński’s or Tusk’s, was not represented in the key discussion on the future of Central and Eastern Europe.
Twitter was full of accusations, misrepresentations, grievances, and rude bickering between ministers and politicians of the government and those representing the president’s circles. To all this, the former US ambassador to Poland, Georgette Mosbacher, referred at least twice, she “had to” explain to Polish journalists what really had happened, why the Polish delegation was never there.
Polish dreams of becoming a regional power are vanishing. We are very far from the moments when, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland was poised to become a regional powerhouse.
Thanks to its support for Kyiv, its role as a diplomatic mediator between the West and pro-Western non-EU countries, and its massive defence spending, which amounts to nearly 5% of the GDP, Poland was expected to become a model, as well as a leader for NATO’s eastern flank and the most important nation between Berlin and Kyiv. None of these ambitions have been realized. As is often the case in Polish history, the country’s political elites are to blame.
Directions of Attack
In domestic politics, Nawrocki will most likely attack the government using various legislative methods. It will be all about polarisation and mobilisation of the hardcore voters – not about real state management or effective managerial practices.
So far, his first legislative initiative was a return to the ‘old model’ for building the Central Communication Port. Despite some slow progress on the airport’s construction, the coalition cannot claim it as a success, having extended the deadline by two years after initially criticizing the project and calling for its cancellation. His second project is a zero personal income tax for families with two children—a demagogic proposal that no one will agree to, and which brings profits mainly to the richest families, but one that sounds appealing in a time of demographic crisis. The third initiative concerns the ‘Defence of the Polish Countryside’ which aims to extend the ban on selling Polish farmland and calls on the government to fight for Polish interests within the Common Agricultural Policy.
Nawrocki will often reformulate ideas from the governing coalition’s 2023 election campaign, thereby weakening its social support, which is already extremely low. The main issue right now is the increase of the tax-free allowance, which Tusk’s party talked about in its 2023 election campaign. Among his 21 points, a kind of political program, there is mention of nuclear energy, port expansion, housing policy, civil defence, migration, and the indexation of social benefits. It’s important to note that the ruling parties had their own ideas on each of these issues, yet most of the time, after two years, they have not implemented them.
In the eyes of Poles, the government is simply not fulfilling its role, whether it’s fighting PiS, holding the right accountable, taking over state administration in “democratic” hands, or fighting for the rights of women or minorities.
On another front, Nawrocki will try to tempt government coalition partners from Poland 2050 or the Polish People’s Party. These two groups, under pressure from Tusk and his largest party within the coalition, Civic Coalition, may at some point, blocked for example by a presidential veto, go to the negotiating table with Nawrocki and Law and Justice, whose leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, will certainly be keen to play the coalition’s differences to his advantage.
What’s more, Nawrocki, while building his own base, since Law and Justice did not nominate him in the elections, but only endorsed him, may enter into a partnership with the far-right Confederation, a party currently polling at around 15%. Such an alliance would certainly not be in Kaczyński’s interest, although, without clear representation in the Sejm, the Confederation, which has only a dozen or so MPs, does not currently pose a threat, but this may change in 2027. In any case, by cooperating with them, Nawrocki will be able to signal his independence while building his position for the 2030 presidential elections and his work on a new constitution, the results of which we are to learn at that time.
Donald Tusk (front row, first from the left) listens to Karol Nawrocki’s inaugural address. Poland’s polarisation and fierce political struggle enters in a new period. Photo by Zack Masternak.
The main question, however, concerns how Nawrocki’s political manoeuvres—and the slowly emerging ideas of Kaczyński, such as whether to form a coalition with Tusk’s current right-wing partners, move further to the right toward the Confederation, or fight for independent power—will ultimately impact the program of Law and Justice. Will we continue to deal with a conservative, yet social party, or perhaps a political force that finds its ‘social’ or populist appeal in far-right, free-market ideas, much like Trump does? This is not clear yet.
However, any dreams of Law and Justice for independent power are currently just that—dreams. Such a scenario would be more plausible if Kaczyński could split the Confederation into its two main components: the protectionist, socially-minded nationalists and the laissez-faire right-wing libertarians. The only question is whether such a game, aimed at division, would be in the new president’s interest. After all, the existence of a second force on the right strengthens his negotiating position with Kaczyński.
“God Bless Poland!”
In this whole landscape, however, any vision for Poland that goes beyond political conflict disappears. Foreign relations? Pro-demographic policy? Tax policy? International alliances? A new constitution? On each of these topics, Nawrocki and Tusk will have different opinions.
Interestingly, we saw this already during the election campaign. The vast majority of Nawrocki’s proposals, particularly his tax plans and exemptions proposal, were not tailored to the needs of the state or even the needs of the people who voted for him. Those from so-called Poland B who clapped enthusiastically on the day of Nawrocki’s inauguration would actually be hurt, should the libertarian vision of totally low taxes came true.
However, the proposals were crafted just for the rhetoric of a campaign and for the sake of strengthening president’s perpetual opposition to the Tusk government. Nawrocki knows his proposals will be rejected, which will allow him to further perform a rhetorical dance around them, claiming the government is doing nothing. The coalition, however, will not be able to challenge them on fact-checked base because it lacks the ability to do so, not being accustomed to it in conditions of polarization based on emotions and a competition over who has more energy, strength, and political momentum in attacking their opponents.
In such an environment, substantive views become a liability, not an asset.
Meanwhile, any consensus will not be in the interest of the two parties. Even if it is de facto developed in the quiet of their offices, in public debate there will be more and more disputes. Yet, this consensus is required on many issues by the international situation, not only in communication directed at enemies of Polish security interests, such as Russia, but also in communication with our allies, both overseas and our closer neighbours. Allies have already noticed this, and the result is Poland’s absence in Washington, which was an opportunity for an almost fanatic brawl on social media between Polish politicians.
The president’s closing address, heard by millions of people across the country, with the words ‘God bless Poland!’ from this perspective, sounds like a threat… Without this blessing, Poland may simply not survive the coming avalanche of events, or it may wake up in a much, much worse place.
Cover photo: Polish presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Jasionka, Poland, May 27, 2025. Photo by Tia Dufour, source
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