Dessislava Mikova: Western Europe and Poland offer examples of advancing just transitions
In this interview, the Greenpeace Bulgaria expert discusses how – and whether – this process is making steps forward in Bulgaria, the obstacles it faces, and the inspiration that can be drawn from other EU countries. She also talks about her hope for decentralizing and diversifying energy production and consumption in Bulgaria, as opposed to the shift from big coal to big solar
Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat, Vladimir Mitev
Dessislava Mikova is a journalist and clean environment activist. She works as a coordinator of the Climate and Energy Campaign at Greenpeace Bulgaria.
Vladimir Mitev: What is the role which big energy businessmen play in the just energy transition process in Bulgaria, for instance, in Pernik, one of the three regions selected for receiving European support in the process?
Dessislava Mikova: Hristo Kovachki, an energy businessman, is a very important player in the coal sector. Although he does not officially own anything in Bulgaria, with very few exceptions, the truth is that the ownership of the oldest and most polluting power plants can be traced back to entities linked to him since the period of privatization in which he participated.
From what we have seen so far, the group surrounding this businessman is interested in draining as much money as possible from the existing installations without investing. They benefit from keeping coal and refusing to plan for transition or decommissioning. If we had constructive conversations about which power plants should be closed first, quite a few of the installations related to Kovachki would already be closed. They have been completely incapable of generating any profit for years, except through different subsidy schemes.
The just transition mechanism has three pillars. One pillar is for businesses. However, Bulgarian businesses prefer grants to loans, which must be repaid, so the supported businesses must generate real profits. This is why we believe that these power plants and their associated groups are actively trying to squeeze every last drop of money out of them.
Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat: In this context, it becomes clear why the just transition budget for Bulgaria contains a disproportionate percentage of support for big enterprises, compared to other tasks that could have been financed.
That is probably one part of the story. Another part is that, since the country is very far behind in the transition process, we’re 10 years late having these discussions. The idea is to quickly switch from one big thing to another, as opposed to diversifying properly.
For 10 years, we’ve been pointing out that, in order to have a just transition, you need to plan it in stages, forecast what will happen when, and arrange not only for the energy part—so that there is enough energy production to substitute what you’re decommissioning—but also for the social and employment aspects. One of the problems is that it’s not seen as an opportunity for regions to diversify, rely on multiple industries, and become more resilient.
The idea has been to switch from coal to another big industry, and part of that idea is to keep the workforce centralized. This has been a major problem for trade unions because they rely on the coal power plant workforce in the Maritsa East Basin but are not active in private power plants. When they say they protest the rights of workers in the coal sector, they mean almost entirely state-owned power plants. They have never been able to do much for workers’ rights in the power plants associated with Kovachki, for example. And the working conditions there have been questionable for a very long time. However, trade unions in Bulgaria have traditionally been linked to large, state-owned companies and manufacturers.
Having said this,I think it is important to acknowledge that labor rights are extremely important and that it’s crucial to have labor rights representation. The big question for me is how successful it has been in the discussion on just transition, because it hasn’t been constructive.
Until a few years ago, the consensus was that coal would last until 2050, and now it’s until 2038, which is still completely unrealistic. Promising unrealistic things isn’t a good way forward.
Two years ago I interviewed your colleague at Greenpeace Romania, who deals with prosumers. I was curious about the fact that in the beginning of April 2025 in Romania around 204 000 households are prosumers. This fits well with the idea of a green transition, which is also about shifting societal balances and empowering citizens or groups who are not usually strong energetically. To what extent does Bulgaria’s ongoing green transition empower its citizens? Or are people who already have money, who are economically strong, doing the transition and getting the most profit?
Unfortunately, the green transition in Bulgaria hasn’t presented the enormous opportunities that come with it to the average citizen, so we have very few prosumers. There are still many barriers to small-scale installations. In fact, there has been tremendous development in solar energy, particularly in the past three-four years. There are 4,5 GW of installed solar capacity in Bulgaria, as of mid-2025, public data shows. However, half of that capacity is in 30 installations, according to the data, compiled by Capital, a weekly economic publication. This means that much of that expansion is concentrated in large capacities.
This is not necessarily a bad thing, because some of these investments have involved different players. This somewhat diversifies the highly centralized energy system in Bulgaria. However, this shows the huge potential for citizens to participate, which has yet to be realized. We see this as a problem because it’s about making communities more resilient and independent in terms of energy. Renewable energy offers many benefits, including lifting vulnerable people out of energy poverty and preventing others from falling into it. Bulgaria has yet to fully embrace those benefits.
In Bulgaria it might be necessary to help not only the most vulnerable, but also the lower middle class. Some of those people might need support for their energy bills, and investing in small-scale solar installations for their own use could provide direct, long-term help. However, we don’t see enough schemes for targeted support for households.
Why isn’t this empowerment of the common man happening?
There’s a big interest in keeping this industry centralized. A centralized energy system is easier to operate, for example, for the transmission operator. You see how these things are used politically, especially with people’s fears about unemployment in coal regions. This has been used in multiple elections now. People’s independent agency is generally a very scary thing politically. In addition, a lot of investment is needed, and right now, there’s a preference for large-scale projects because there’s only one entry point into the system.
The grid generally needs a lot of investment and modernization to connect more small-scale producers. This type of investment needs to be directed toward transforming the system. This system has been used for political leverage in the past, and it’s difficult to remove those levers because transforming the system inherently involves removing some of those levers. Sometimes I feel that the change in fuel isn’t as scary for stakeholders as keeping the system centralized. In multiple discussions and events, I’ve noticed that people get triggered when you mention decentralization.
It’s not so much about solar or wind as it is about decentralized power.
Why is this happening? Decentralization seems to be happening in Romania but not in Bulgaria. But they were also centralized and had too many connections that were too complex for the energy operators and distributors. Yet, it is happening there. So, what is different there, as far as you know?
People who see the benefit and have the money for the upfront investment usually opt for renewable energy, and we’ve seen this with small businesses that have their own rooftops or land in the past couple of years. They see that the volatility of the electricity markets needs to be leveraged, and the best way is with their own installations.
That is one thing I am curious about. There is also the issue of the liberalization of energy markets. From what I read in the media, there is some fear that prices will rise significantly. On the one hand, there is this perhaps legitimate resistance to liberalization, because of social reasons. On the other hand, it’s a common EU policy that will probably happen sooner or later. If the aim is decentralization, how will it take place? What will happen to households in the context of a liberalized energy market?
There are quite a few interconnected aspects around it. I am going to start with the idea that, with the liberalization of the market and the ability to choose one’s own provider, the cost of each energy source will be obvious to households. Currently, renewable energy, especially solar, is the cheapest. Therefore, more people would be interested in buying it, or installing it. Therefore, demand for expensive fossil fuels would decrease. That is one way to do it.
The regulated market has very cheap prices, but they are kept down artificially. The bill is footed through different ways. We pay for it one way or another, but it doesn’t come directly out of our pockets in the form of electricity bills because subsidies for fossil fuel companies come from our taxes.
It’s just not written on our bill. This is one communication issue because many populists claim that liberalization will increase electricity prices. However, the truth is that, in order to save the state-owned coal power plant, as well as the state-owned coal mining company, the Minister of Energy signs a bill each year that essentially secures a large segment of the regulated market for power from Maritsa East 2.
The liberalization of the market could also have a positive outcome: increased efficiency and sufficiency. The Bulgarian industry is the least energy efficient in Europe. There is also a lot of energy waste due to a lack of building insulation. When more people see the cost and benefit of energy savings, they could be inspired to invest in savings measures. This applies not only to households but also to businesses, which can optimize their energy use to avoid wasting energy.
Currently, the idea of savings is even demonised.
People say things like, “You want to bring us back to the cave. You want to bring us back to the early ’90s when we had power cuts and blackouts.” There is huge potential for savings, though.
What is the reason, or what are the reasons, that parliament objects to this liberalization?
This is one of the last remaining ways to support Maritsa East coal companies. If the state doesn’t have a way to sell its energy on the regulated market, then what will happen? And if Maritsa East closes its power plants, the mines will be affected because they will lose their customers.
Basically, there won’t be anyone to buy coal from them.
The bigger problem in terms of employment is in the mines, where about 6,500 people are employed. These developments were foreseeable ten years ago and no action has been taken!
Imagine what could have been done for people—not just workers, but consumers of electricity in the country. What could have been done for the regions and companies? What could the Bulgarian energy holding company have done in these 10 years? The measures taken at the last possible minute will not be no more than emergency measures. No one deserves this, least of all the workers. However, any discussion about this process and its timeline was immediately shut down by many governments over many years.
Is there a specific industrial policy for the Stara Zagora region? As far as I understand, the intention is to keep working people employed in a new industry that will come, but nobody knows what it will actually be. And one of the key success factors in the economic transitions that are today considered quite successful transformations, such as in West German coal regions, was that people knew what kind of new employment they would get when leaving the coal industry.
For instance, they knew the automotive industry would offer workplaces for them. Is there a concept like that in Bulgaria?
There isn’t a clear public strategy or plan. This is also important because reskilling and new employment opportunities should be in sync.
Stara Zagora has other industries, but nothing compares in size to the mining industry. The conversation about alternative industries has only begun in the past two to three years, which is an incredibly short time to find investors.
Another thing to note is that in this day and age, there won’t be one solution. If someone promises a single solution to solve the employment issue for 8,000 people from the state-owned coal industry, that’s not realistic. It’s not realistic because that’s not how the industry works anymore. This is due to automation, digitalization, and many other factors coinciding with this transition.
When the territorial just transition plans were presented, a long list of investment proposals were announced. There are companies that have declared interest in investing. For example, Maritsa East, the state-owned mine and power plant, has a 300-million-dollar solar project and is still looking for an investor a year after declaring interest in the project.
In addition, I’m afraid nothing of this scale will happen in the next year or two. This is a problem, and people are rightfully scared that they will actually be left behind.
For example, one of the private power plants, ContourGlobal Maritsa East 3 in Stara Zagora, shut down. It had a long-term power purchase agreement that expired in February 2024. It wasn’t economically feasible to continue its operation. There isn’t a market for its production because it is too expensive.
Since then it has been operational for a few days in the height of summer and winter when electricity demand increases. At the beginning, the operator said they would stop working but not lay anyone off. However, they laid off half the workforce a month and a half later. Currently, the operation cycle is not sustainable and the operator is looking for some form of state support to remain online. This shows that the coal industry is completely inefficient in economic terms.
False promises are quickly dismantled in this situation. Then there’s the example of an unjust transition in the Bobov Dol region, which is close to Pernik. The company there is related to Kovachki and privatized the underground mines in Bobov Dol. They were closed very soon after – in 2012, with no assistance for the workers. The workers were just left completely in the dark. Many of them are still waiting for compensation from the closure. This is an example of how terrible things can play out if a transition of this magnitude is left to the free market forces. This is basically what’s going on at the moment.
This is unfortunate because a just transition can only happen in a planned way. We see what happens when the market only makes the transition: it doesn’t think about the workers at all. The market does not consider the social implications of such drastic changes. Unfortunately, we’ve seen how these things play out terribly in other places in the world.
Like in the Jiu Valley in Romania, where we were last year. It’s, unfortunately, a fairly common story everywhere, with people being left behind and empty promises being made.
I think the biggest empty promise is that coal will last forever. It’s the most unfortunate empty promise because there’s a lot of discussion about how the just transition is an empty promise. However, we tried to participate in discussions about the just transition process, fund, and mechanism, as well as the just transition territorial plans.
During those public consultations, I almost never heard any constructive proposals. It was just “no” after “no.”
No to any changes?
Yes, just saying no to any change. Then, Europe is blamed for providing the money for the changes. This is a missed opportunity because this type of funding could have been transformative.
There could have been a discussion about getting more money and how to put it to good use. But the discussion was always about rejecting any change and any alternative proposal because that would mean accepting that coal won’t last until 2038 or 2050.
What is your opinion on the plans that were finally sent to Brussels? We talked about them with an expert from the Center for the Study of Democracy who evaluated them. She said she was disappointed with them. She said they were not ambitious at all. Do you also think that much more could have been included?
Yes, I agree. They could have been much more ambitious. Bulgaria could have gotten involved much earlier in the process. Bulgaria submitted its plans at the very last minute, almost losing the funding altogether. 100 million euros was lost for missing the first deadline.
The whole process was disappointing because it was not held in a constructive manner. Both the organizers and the participants are responsible for constructive discussions. It’s difficult for me to say exactly what went wrong because I think the whole process could have been much better. However, it clashed with the decade-long promise that there would be no changes in these regions. Participation in such a process from the perspective of no change is challenging. This compromise document is the result.
Can you say there are positive changes?
Many businesses installed their own capacities. Another very positive development is the municipality-organized energy community in Gabrovo. The municipality there is quite progressive. They created a project for their waste separation depot. They have a municipal company and a building with a large roof. The municipality provided administrative support. The rooftop is used for solar panels. Citizens, as participants in an energy community, crowdfunded money to purchase the solar panels. The waste separation company buys energy from the solar panels and uses it in the same area. The energy is used where it is produced
The depot will use most of the system’s output, and the remainder is distributed to municipal consumers as close by as possible. This is a positive example of how citizens and the municipality can collaborate on a project to produce energy where it is consumed.This can also be a model for large-scale projects. Following the success of this project, the Municipality of Gabrovo set up a second such community project, at their transportation depot.
There are many examples in Western Europe that demonstrate how collaboration between businesses, municipalities, and citizens increases the social acceptance of large-scale projects. This is one way for citizens to be part of the transition, too. For instance, even if they don’t have their own rooftop, they can participate by investing in larger projects.
This can also make big businesses, who are the investors, more acceptable. They can be not just acceptable but also meaningful to the local communities where they invest and develop profitable businesses. This is also a way forward for Bulgaria, which still has quite a bit of potential in this area.
However, it’s about empowering people and establishing these collaborations, which can be very energy-intensive. Investors probably need incentives to be open to this.
I think this is the key factor because in Poland, the regions that go forward with just transition are those where local communities take the initiative and generate ideas. I am referring to local trade unions, small businesses, and local citizens associations. Those who stuck to the notion that the government or the European Union would solve the problem are now in a tough situation.
That’s it.
I remember ZEPAK [Eastern Wielkopolska region, Poland]. They said, “We are going to transition. Let’s do it together.” It might not have been ideal, but from a Bulgarian perspective, it was interesting to see the utility company be open to and plan for the transition.
It was a private company, not a state-owned power plant, which, in my view, has played quite a role. Indeed, the region where they are located is perhaps the most advanced in terms of transitioning, second only to Silesia, where I live. However, Silesia is a different story. We have very strong historical and connectivity ties to Germany. It is relatively easy to attract investment with or without transition. Companies from Germany have always been interested in investing there.
In Eastern Wielkopolska, where ZEPAK is located, I attended a conference held by local authorities and the local development agency on the progress of the just transition at the beginning of this year. They really emphasized that point. I’ve never seen another region in transition that says we must do it because it’s our region and our future. If we don’t take care of it ourselves, nobody else will. It was a really fantastic thing.
There is so much that can be done if people are willing to work. Of course, you could always argue that one thing can’t be replicated in another region. But I think there are always lessons you can learn and apply.
In fact, our starting points were not that different, even though Poland is a bigger country, the starting point was similar: a centralized system with the state having a monopoly on energy issues and high dependency on coal.
You’ve had foreign investment and corporations coming to Poland since the beginning.
We do, but that creates other kinds of problems. If you have oligarchs, then we have struggled with the issue of foreign investment forcing local communities to offer tax cuts so that corporations stay in a region. They literally threatened that if they were not exempted from taxes, they would move elsewhere. Some foreign investments were deliberately choosing areas badly affected by the transition of the ’90s to open their plants and offer low wages, knowing people would be happy with any job. So, this is not the best development model either.
This brings me to another issue that trade unionists may have raised: because of unionized jobs in the coal industry in Stara Zagora, workers have competitive salaries. Stara Zagora is second only to Sofia in terms of average salary. One issue is that foreign investors have historically been attracted by low labor expenses. The challenge is to transition to competitive business opportunities.
At the same time, if we go back to the efficiency of the Bulgarian economy, I think we’re the lowest in terms of productivity per person per hour. There are problems that need to be dealt with that don’t necessarily come from the transition itself, but they coincide with it. This makes it challenging to attract investment that doesn’t just thrive on very low wages.
In recent years, the minimum wage in Bulgaria has been rising. A few big employers left for countries with lower wages. Again, a few of these examples were big employers who laid off a thousand people, for example, in a rural area where there are no other job opportunities.
Laying off a thousand people who don’t have anywhere else to go is a significant problem. It’s also a significant problem because many of them don’t have the skills to start their own business. How can you start a business if everyone in the area loses their job? Nobody will have money to buy goods or services.
This again points to the problem of depending on one large employer. This is a lesson learned from places like certain regions of Belgium, where they transitioned from coal to a large chemical factory. Then, the chemical factory also closed. So, in 30 years, they had to deal with the same transition twice.
We’re all facing these problems. Maybe it’s time to look for alternative ways to represent workers when the workforce is no longer centralized. That is an important issue. We can’t go back only because we’re not prepared for what’s coming.
This interview has been prepared with the support of Journalismfund, within the scope of a broader project concerning just transition in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Czechia in a comparative perspective.
Photo: Dessislava Mikova (source: YouTube)
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