Netanyahu Regained Popularity Through Escalation. Now, Early Elections? [Interview]
– There was an expectation among the Palestinians that Iran would turn out to be a more powerful actor in a confrontation against Israel, to a level that can impose a ceasefire on Israel in Gaza too. The outcome didn’t live up to those expectations. In my view, and I’ve said this many times, Palestinians must rely only on themselves. We cannot count on any regional or international actors, whether states or institutions. If we are strong internally, then we can be strong as a people. But if we are weak from within, no outside force will be able to help us — says Hamada Jaber, a Palestinian political analyst and researcher.
First, I want to ask you about the mood in the West Bank now, after the Israel-Iran war. How are people adjusting to the new reality? +972 Magazine reports that Israel imposed a state of siege on the West Bank starting on June 13.
We’ve witnessed an increase in Israeli military checkpoints and a growing division between Palestinian cities and towns across the West Bank. There has also been a noticeable shortage of fuel and gas coming through Israel, and several other crises linked to Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was only able to pay 35% of April’s salaries about three weeks ago due to the Israeli collective punishment policy of not transferring revenues that Israel collects on behalf of the PA – despite the fact that Israel takes commission for collecting this money
In addition, there’s an ongoing crisis involving the Israeli shekel currency, the main currency in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.. According to the Paris Protocol between the PA and Israel, there’s an agreement on how much the Palestinian banks can transfer to the Israeli Central Bank on a monthly basis. This figure has not changed since this mechanism was established more than 30 years ago. This is despite the increase in trade between Israel and Palestine, population growth, and economic development. The quota should have increased significantly, but Israel refuses to revise it.
As a result, Palestinian banks are now holding billions of shekels they cannot transfer or convert. This has become a major economic bottleneck. Combined with the salary crisis and the closures, the overall economic situation in the West Bank is extremely dire. There’s a severe shortage of fuel, gas, and liquid cash in people’s hands.
Before the 7 October, around 200,000 people used to work in Israel and the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, crossing the wall or checkpoints daily. Are they still allowed to work?
Definitely not. Since October 7, the vast majority of these people have not been permitted to work. Out of roughly 200,000 workers, perhaps only 10,000 to 20,000 have managed to retain their jobs. The remaining 180,000 or so have been effectively unemployed since then.
If not them, then what sustains the economy of the West Bank now? If I recall correctly, the Palestinian Authority was always the largest employer, followed by employment in Israeli settlements — a sort of bonded labour system imposed on Palestinians. So how are people surviving financially now?
They’re not. Most of these people have been jobless since October 7. Some are trying to make ends meet by doing small informal jobs here and there, but these don’t offer real income compared to what they were earning before. The Palestinian Authority occasionally provides limited financial assistance to these workers, but the amounts too small to make any real difference.
That’s why I say the situation in the West Bank is distressing. I would even say we’ve never seen it this bad before.
Last year, there were some clashes between the IDF and Palestinian resistance factions. Have there been any demonstrations, strikes, or other forms of protest recently?
No, not really. The escalation has been entirely one-sided. The Israeli army continues to raid Palestinian cities and towns almost daily. Moreover, settler violence has reached extreme levels over the past two months.
We no longer see armed confrontations or exchanges of fire between Palestinian groups and the Israeli military. It’s entirely one-sided now — Israeli forces are arresting people and conducting daily raids. Like on 25 June when the soldiers killed three Palestinians in a village near Ramallah.
And there haven’t been any strikes or protests against the Palestinian Authority, for example over their failure to secure salaries or push back economically?
Over the past 15 years, the Palestinian Authority has effectively dismantled all civil institutions that could organize such actions — unions, professional associations, and other bodies that once played a role in mobilizing people. As a result, there’s no existing structure capable of coordinating collective action. At the same time, people are aware that the region is in flames, and they’re trying to preserve whatever stability they have. They know that, in the grand scheme of things, the Palestinian Authority is weak — essentially powerless.
What was Mahmoud Abbas’s position on the recent Iranian-Israeli escalation?
The Palestinian leadership has not taken any clear position. The only thing I heard was that, like most Arab countries, they condemned the Iranian attack on the American base in Qatar yesterday. Beyond that, I haven’t heard any statements.
And how did people in the West Bank respond to this escalation? Did it change the general mood?
Based on what I observe, I’d say that the mood has definitely shifted. After what many see as genocide in Gaza, there’s a widespread sentiment of welcoming any state that challenges Israel. And many Palestinians were disappointed. There was perhaps an expectation that Iran would turn out to be a more powerful actor in this confrontation – possibly, a player that can impose a ceasefire on Israel in Gaza too. And we have all seen what was the outcome.
In my view — and I’ve said this many times — Palestinians must rely only on themselves. We cannot count on any regional or international actors, whether states or institutions. If we are strong internally, then we can be strong as a people. But if we are weak from within, no outside force will be able to help us. That’s the fundamental truth that the current Palestinian leadership ignores.
Unfortunately, it might be too late for this kind of realization to make a meaningful difference. What’s also clear is that there is a growing disconnect between the people and the leadership — they’re not aligned on many fundamental issues.
Part of the current Israeli government openly states that they don’t care whether the Palestinian Authority survives or collapses. This position is in direct contrast to that of Israel’s security institutions, which still believe in maintaining and even strengthening the Palestinian Authority to preserve order.
But key figures in the Israeli coalition, such as Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, are actively working to undermine the PA. They pursue policies aimed at weakening it every day. Both banking and currency crises I mentioned earlier are examples of these deliberate efforts. The Israeli government is using such measures to further destabilize and erode the authority of the PA.
Do you believe Israel has truly achieved its strategic objectives regarding Iran? You mentioned that Netanyahu’s popularity has risen — and indeed, recent polls suggest that public support for the strikes was significant.
But looking beyond short-term approval, is Israeli society really capable of withstanding one escalation after another? Consider the situation in Gaza: we’re now seeing American mercenaries overseeing food distribution—something many observers view as little more than a smokescreen. There are even reports of Palestinian criminal groups being contracted by the IDF for certain operations.
Doesn’t all of this suggest that Israel is approaching the limits of its capacity to manage a protracted and multifaceted conflict?
I think that Israeli society has demonstrated a surprising degree of resilience. This is the first time in its history that Israel has engaged in a war of this scale and duration, and most analysts initially assumed the public wouldn’t tolerate such a prolonged conflict. But here we are, nearly two years in, and Israeli society continues to show endurance. I believe this is largely because many Israelis are convinced of Netanyahu’s claims that the sacrifices will lead to a long-term strategic advantage, that their security will be won for decades.
Look at what’s happened during this period: Hezbollah, historically one of Israel’s most formidable enemies, has been largely inactive. The Assad regime in Syria—while never a direct threat—previously served as a key conduit between Iran and Hezbollah, but that channel is effectively gone. The issue of Iran and its nuclear ambitions remains the most significant issue.
I think Israelis believe that enduring the current hardship might bring about decisive, strategic gains. That’s the message Netanyahu has been consistently trying to sell to the public: that what is happening now is not about short-term revenge or tactical success—it’s about changing the balance of power for decades to come.
Is this a strategy Netanyahu only would apply? Wouldn’t any Israeli leader behave like this?
No, I don’t think so. This isn’t “Israel” as a whole — it’s Netanyahu. Any other Israeli leader would have hesitated many times before launching an attack on Iran or attempting something as extreme as assassinating Hassan Nasrallah.
But Netanyahu is acting out of a unique political necessity. He knows he bears responsibility for the October 7 failure, and he’s determined to compensate for that by reshaping Israel’s strategic position. He’s calculating, and I believe he’s prepared these moves carefully, with solid planning and coordination.
In that sense, he has succeeded to some extent. His popularity is rising. He’s managed to shift the public’s focus from his failure on October 7 to his broader military and strategic agenda.
Do you think he might try to capitalize on this popularity politically?
Yes, definitely. I think he’s now considering ending the war in Gaza, bringing back the Israeli hostages, and then calling for early elections. He probably sees this as the right moment to do so, while his popularity is climbing.
Of course, the coalition he currently leads is another matter. Even if his own party is doing well in the polls, some of his coalition partners are not. According to current projections, the coalition as a whole wouldn’t win a majority if elections were held today.
But Netanyahu is a seasoned political operator. If necessary, he could shift alliances and bring in new partners. At the end of the day, I think Netanyahu accepted his current coalition partners, because he had no other choice. It’s clear he doesn’t fully align with them politically. They weren’t his preferred option for forming a government. But all the other parties refused to join him, for various reasons. After the next election, Netanyahu could establish a new government with different partners and remain prime minister.
How do you think the war in Gaza will actually end? For a long time, the Israeli government has promoted the idea of a mass exodus, suggesting that people would either flee Gaza or die there.
Looking at the current situation — especially through social media and on the ground reporting — it’s difficult to imagine conditions being any worse. I recall a scientific article last year, published in Nature or a similar medical journal, estimating that the total death toll in Gaza, including those who died from lack of healthcare, food, or basic services, was around 192,000. That was before the latest escalation. A report published by Harvard Database says that the current number of people who died during this genocide stakes around 380 thousand people…
Do you think any kind of agreement is still possible? The Arab states have made clear they oppose forced deportation and are unwilling to absorb the population. But despite that, displacement now seems more likely than a negotiated deal.
At this stage, the top priority for Netanyahu and for Israeli society is to bring back the hostages. That can’t happen without a deal. For most Israelis, failure to bring the remaining hostages—maybe around 20 still alive—would be perceived as a national defeat.
There is an understanding among Israelis that achieving this goal will come at a cost—such as releasing Palestinian prisoners and ending the war. But it’s considered a price worth paying. At the same time, Hamas has nothing left to lose. After everything that’s happened, the only leverage they still hold is the hostages. And they’re not willing to give them up without guarantees. Hamas insists there must be a clear, enforceable agreement. They don’t trust Israel to follow through, especially given experiences where agreements were not honoured. That distrust has only grown in the era of Netanyahu—and earlier, with Trump—when words and terms were manipulated to serve political ends.
Today, Hamas demands practical steps, not promises. For example, the current proposal involves releasing 10 hostages in exchange for a two- or three-month ceasefire. But Israel, backed by the U.S., wants those hostages released on day one. Hamas has refused.
Instead, they’ve offered to release eight hostages initially, and the remaining two only at the end of the ceasefire period—once negotiations over a permanent truce are underway. They are holding firm because they need assurances that Israel will respect any agreement reached.
So yes, the fate of the hostages and the terms of a ceasefire are central to any possible resolution—but only if both sides can come to an enforceable, mutually trusted deal.
Hamada Jaber is a Palestinian political analyst and researcher born in Jerusalem. He holds a master’s degree in strategic studies from S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations School (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore, 2023. He also holds a master’s degree in Peacekeeping & Security Studies from the Faculty of Political Science in Roma Tre University and a bachelor’s degree in business administration from The Arab American University, 2006, Palestine. He worked for 8 years with the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PCPSR), an independent non-profit institution and think tank. The Center was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. Hamada Jaber is also a political activist and co-founder and a volunteer board member in One State Foundation (OSF), a foundation officially established in 2017 in the Netherlands and has Palestinian, Israelis, and International members and supporters to promote one-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis and the international actors.
Cover photo: Benjamin Netanyahu in Davos, 2014. Photo by Jolanda Flubacher.
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