Conservatism and neo-nazism in Germany today

Posted by Thomas Klikauer
The image above shows Germany’s CDU-boss Friedrich Merz in a classical position opposite Germany’s neo-fascist AfD boss Weidel. One can almost imagine his fictional words, “thank you, my Führer”.
Merz (CDU) and Weidel (AfD) are surrounded by Weidel’s party clowns, the clueless Tino Chrupalla and the senile Alexander Gauland.
The leader of German conservatism, Merz, was grateful to Germany’s foremost Neo-Nazis. The neo-fascist AfD had just supported the tightening of migration rules.
While asphyxiating themselves in the AfD’s favourite propaganda trap of xenophobic anti-migration policies, the actual number of asylum applications is declining.
With Merz’s new CDU-AfD collusion, the much acclaimed firewall of non-cooperation between both parties was seriously damaged by the self-promoting Merz’s quest for power.
With Merz’s newly found “conservative+Nazi” collusion, many have argued that a coalition with the AfD would be the end for the conservative CDU.
Meanwhile, the entire affair might have been a strategic mistake made by Friedrich Merz. Yet Merz is not alone. The very ambitious careerist, party-internal strongman, creator of the costly mask-scandal and high- level party apparatchik – Jens Spahn – also fancies an “Hitler-Papen-like” AfD-CDU coalition.
Go-getter and careerist Spahn also believes that a ban against AfD party could do more harm than good. Last time around – during the 1930s – a ban against Hitler’s Nazi might have saved fifty million lives. Auschwitz would still be no more than a sleepy town called Oświęcim.
Given the experience of many other conservative political parties in Europe, one can indeed trace the disintegration of conservative parties through the appearance of right-wing, authoritarian, and neo-fascist political parties at the European level.
By courting the neo-fascist AfD, everyone is wondering whether Friedrich Merz’s chancellorship is under a sullied star from its very beginning.
Merz’s strategic blunder was indeed extraordinary. Even more worryingly, it sheds light on the political mortgage Friedrich Merz has with his wooing of the AfD – right at the start of taking office.
Meanwhile, there was no talk of a triumphant entry into Germany’s chancellery. To put it mildly, it was a gaffe. In other words, Merz’s taking control of power was a classical “Fehlstart” (a false start) from the very beginning.
Since the election, it has already become apparent that there is unrest inside Merz’s CDU. This started with a destructive dispute over something called The Special Fund or Off-Budget Fund.
This little budgetary trickery bypassed Merz’s core election promise, namely, to maintain the conservatives’ favourite hobbyhorse. This is the so-called “debt break”. It once promis-“ed” not to increase Germany’s state debt.
All of this, creates at least two temporary problems for the self-nominated Mr Fix and Chancellor Merz:
- State Debt: Merz wasn’t truthful with the electorate. Before the election, Merz assured the electorate to maintain the debt break – the infamous Schuldenbremse. Shortly after the election, Merz suddenly increased Germany’s state debt – ending the Schuldenbremse.
- Neo-Nazis: Merz wasn’t truthful with the electorate on the issue of the AfD. Before the election, Merz assured the electorate to maintain the firewall – no dealings with the neo-fascist AfD. Yet, Merz suddenly cooperated with the neo-fascist AfD on a rather unnecessary asylum issue. This is the second promise that Merz had broken – in quick succession.
Breaking two significant election promises in such a short time in the hope the electorate will have forgotten in four years’ time, puts Merz into the crossfire – for now.
These are the reasons why Merz failed on the parliament’s first ballot to become chancellor. Merz’s historic failure came as a no surprise given his two backflips.
One actually got the impression that even his own conservatives were not standing united behind him. This is despite the fact that many newly elected apparatchiks come from the Merz camp.
The fact that there seems to be a lack of support for Merz also indicates a much larger dissatisfaction among conservatives.
This might extend deep into Merz’s coalition agreement with the social-democratic SPD – his coalition party. Merz needs the SPD for his government and to parade himself as chancellor of Germany.
Meanwhile, there is a strong feeling, at least in some sections of the CDU, that the SPD has benefited disproportionally from Merz’s dogged and zealous mission to gain power.
Many still speculate that it was those people in Merz’s own camp who initially refused to get him elected as chancellor – a major embarrassment for power hungry Merz.
Yet, this might never be known – not even in the foreseeable future. Of course, it is also possible that members of the SPD faction wanted the nationalistic AfD-supporter Merz to fail.
The collusion and joint voting of Merz’s CDU and the neo-fascist AfD in January 2025 on toughening up migration had not been forgiven by many people – not only inside the SPD.
Worse, the then opposition leader (Merz) had previously rallied against those he insulted as“left-wing weirdoes”. Many SPD people – who are now in a coalition government with Merz – felt addressed by Merz’s insult.
Merz’s slur might have also been directed against SPD boss Klingbeil and his progressive policies. Beyond all this, the failure of Merz to get elected as chancellor in the first round remains an extraordinary process – unprecedented in Germany’s post-war history.
In this, not everyone – least of all the arrogant Merz – emerged as a winner. The same can be said about negotiations and its outcome that eventually formed the SPD-CDU coalition government.
Worse, some even suggested that the new chancellor was duped into being forced to be needing a second round – a humiliating experience for the over-confident and pig-headed Merz.
In any case, it was a testing start for Merz, for his coalition government and also in terms of his perception abroad where Merz likes to present himself as a resolute strongman.
In addition, the tone inside the CDU has changed. Merz led the conservative party too far to the right when colluding with the neo-fascist AfD.
It was to be expected that Merz would set a more conservative ideology in motion. Merkel’s more liberal minded CDU was, in the mind of Merz, no longer able to win elections.
Many expected a course correction under the conservative ideologue Merz. In this respect, it was only a question of time until Merz positioned the CDU more to the right.
At the same time, the short-term manoeuvre in favour of the AfD in Germany’s parliament – the joint vote on a motion on asylum – was a grave mistake.
Merz’s schmoozing with the neo-fascists has only increased the distrust in Merz questioning his leadership. AfD-supporter Jens Spahn is particularly noticeable in the new government team.
Spahn is certainly the most controversial figure in Merz’s new power structure. Spahn is very interested in the failed Sebastian Kurz and the way Kurz had converted his ÖVP party into his own personality-supporting role tailored to him.
Worse, Kurz maintains strong links into Donald Trump camp, including Trump’s lackey Richard Grenell.
Right-winger Spahn knows exactly how to play on the right-wing populist keyboard. He is a master of far-right tactics and well-targeted provocations, breaking taboos and harsh far right rhetoric.
Unlike Merz, Spahn is more strategically oriented. He is less an ideologue but more of a political opportunist who closely watches every window that opens to further his career and personal power base.
In his new role as the chairman of the CDU’s parliamentary group, freebooter Spahn will probably behave loyal to Merz – for now. But that is unlikely to stay that way.
It is unclear whether it was an ingenious move by Merz to make the firebrand Spahn and AfD ally, the guardian of the CDU’s firewall against the neo-fascist AfD. It might well be a fatal decision.
Yet, the careerist Spahn isn’t fixated on ideology. Instead, the chancellor looks at public polling, moods and opportunities to be exploited – ruthlessly, and mostly for his own gain.
In a way, this makes him even more dangerous – perhaps even unpredictable – compared to Merz. To the opportunist Spahn, it will be strategically advantageous for the CDU to orient itself more to the right.
Yet, crawling up to the right-wing populists has been tried again and again in Europe – mostly with moderate or limited success. The five-fold formula is always the same:
- tougher migration policy,
- Uber-nationalism,
- chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism
- fostering anti-EU sentiments,
- cranking up the so-called culture war.
Usually, this strengthens the parties on the right. Either they say, “see, our position prevails” or they win because conservative party lose voters in the political middle.
Austria’s conservative-neo-fascist “Kurz-FPÖ” collusion was successful, for a short time. So were the British Tories when moving into the right-wing populist corner. But that’s over. It is well known that the balance of power between the conservative ÖVP and the neo-fascist FPÖ has reversed.
In the meantime, right-wing populist Nigel Farage’s Reform UK has put the conservative Tories under severe pressure – even though the Tories have already moved extremely far to the right. Recently, Reform UK has taken hundreds of seats from the Conservatives in local elections.
The CDU would be ill advised to copy that and enable the AfD to make further gains. The more the CDU favours AfD topics, the more the CDU normalises the ideological positions of the neo-fascist AfD. And here comes the key lesson: without benefiting from it.
Long before Merz – during the so-called Kohl Era – there was no credible offer to the right of the CDU. Today, this has changed fundamentally.
Worse, there is a general shift to the right. Even Germany’s democratic parties – that want to present themselves to be ready to assume a governmental role, including Germany’s Greens – have moved to the right in terms of migration policy. The only exception is Germany’s The Left – Die Linke party.
At the same time, we are experiencing strong opposition to many neoliberal-economic and financial-austerity policies. Germany’s so-called special fund, the softening of the debt break, the enthusiasm for state intervention are all issues that were previously unthinkable for many voters in Germany’s political middle.
Overall, Germany shows a shift to the right in migration policy and a shift towards progressive ideas on financial policies.
Germany’s €500bn ($570bn) Special Fund, for example, was supported by the SPD and the Greens. It was a clear departure from the long-standing commitment to austerity in the form of the debt break. Merz made it a reality.
The political centre has not disappeared. Yet, it has recognised the inevitability of circumventing the debt break by coming up with the so-called Special Fund to escape from the corner it had positioned itself.
However, the entire construct is under pressure. The fragmentation of Germany’s party system may well become a permanent feature.
Germany will no longer see political parties with over 40% of voter support in the near future.
This is not just because of political parties themselves, but also the overall social and political trends such as, for example:
- the fight against neoliberalism;
- rampant individualization;
- the dissolution of traditional milieus, neighbourhoods and communities;
- the imperatives of global warming; and
- new issues arising and new alliances forming.
In addition to fragmentation, new parties in Germany succeed much faster. Sahra Wagenknecht’s alliance – the BSW – has shown this.
If the BSW had won just 13,435 more votes and had entered Germany’s parliament in the recent election – it missed entering the parliament by a tiny bit and not missing the required 5% (BSW: 4,981%) – Germans would now be talking about a completely new power structure.
In many ways, Germany shows a trend that one can see in other parliamentarian systems. As a consequence, Germany will see coalitions in various constellations – more often. This increases the political complexity of the system.
And it makes it harder to create trust. There simply is much more friction which makes the much flaunted “delivering for voters” more complicated than it already is.
Politicians have not yet made this sufficiently clear to themselves and to the public. It is only because of the extremely narrow failure of the BSW to enter Germany’s parliament that a coalition between the CDU, the SPD, and the Greens did not come about.
Worryingly, more than ten million people voted for the neo-fascist AfD in the last election – particularly in East-Germany.
The neo-fascist AfD is now “officially” considered a right-wing extremist party. Banning the AfD is discussed.
This is a party that acts openly anti-democratic, cultivates racist rhetoric, maintains networks in the extreme right and Neo-Nazis and is at odds with Germany’s liberal democratic basic order.
Worse, the AfD is no longer a short-lived phenomenon, but an expression of a political current that has been forming for years.
If Merz were to form a conservative-Neo-Nazi coalition with the AfD, there would be dire consequences. It would very well mark the end of the lightening tower of German conservatism in the form of the CDU as we know it.
It would tear the CDU apart. And Friedrich Merz knows this. That’s why such a scenario is extremely unlikely – for now.
Source: www2.lunapic.com/editor/
Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!
Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!