Siyavash Shahabi: It’s an insult to Iranians to call Netanyahu’s strikes a ‘liberation operation.’ Iran has its own freedom struggle and doesn’t need foreign intervention
The Israeli attack on Iran will not lead to the end of Western negotiations with Iran, but will make them more fragmented, securitized and conditional
This interview has been first published on the Persian Bridge of Friendship, Vladimir Mitev’s blog devoted to Iran.
Siyavash Shahabi is the author of the blog The Fire Next Time and a contributor to the progressive Iranian media outlet Radio Zamaneh. He discussed the June 13, 2025, Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its consequences for international relations related to Iran and Iranian society with Vladimir Mitev of the Persian Bridge of Friendship.
How will the Israeli attack on Iran and Iran’s retaliation influence American-Iranian negotiations and Iran’s return to the international economy?
The Israeli attack on Iran marks a decisive shift from proxy tensions to direct military confrontation. This development will not lead to the collapse of negotiations between Iran and the U.S., but it will likely freeze or recalibrate them in ways that serve short-term strategic containment rather than long-term reintegration.
This confrontation will not end negotiations, but it will make them more fragmented, securitized, and conditional. The U.S. and the EU may negotiate non-escalation guarantees rather than reintegration. Iran’s economic diplomacy, already shaped by tactical adaptations to sanctions through China, the UAE, and Turkey, will become more dependent on parallel networks and non-Western financial channels. This will accelerate Iran’s drift toward a semi-peripheral capitalist model with little structural reform.
To what extent will the Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran’s retaliation strengthen the military’s influence in Iranian internal politics versus the technocratic government? If such a development occurs, what will be its significance for Iranian society and its international relations?
The immediate effect of the Israeli attack and Iran’s response will be a political and discursive boost to the military-security bloc within the Islamic Republic, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which now presents itself as the only institution capable of ensuring regime survival.
However, this strengthening comes with a paradox: the strike killed key military figures, such as Hossein Salami [commander of the IRGC – explanation by Cross-Border Talks] and Mohammad Bagheri [chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces]. This creates a leadership vacuum and an opportunity—a moment of transition in which new factions within the military may emerge, or existing divisions may deepen. The technocratic wing, particularly those aligned with market-oriented reform and international re-engagement, will likely be temporarily sidelined as national security becomes the dominant organizing principle of state discourse.
Yet, in the medium term, the regime faces a dilemma: military escalation without economic stabilization leads to internal unrest. Iran’s economy is incapable of sustaining prolonged military confrontation while delivering social welfare or development.
If the military consolidates power, Iran risks becoming a fortress state—inward-looking, repressive, and economically stagnant.
Some argue that Netanyahu has initiated the liberation of Iran. What do Iranians think about the Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory? To what extent do they see this undeclared Israeli war as a war to liberate Iran? How likely is it that Iran will be “liberated” from the outside?
Calling Israel’s attack on Iran a move by Netanyahu to “save itself” insults the Iranian people. Iranians have their own struggle for freedom and have not been waiting for Netanyahu to start a war.
For outside observers, especially those influenced by Israeli propaganda or groups such as the MEK, monarchists, and Pahlavi supporters, this scenario might seem logical. But inside Iran, it is not taken seriously.
What we are witnessing is the beginning of a war between two powers. Despite the regime’s insane rhetoric, it has become clear that Iran does not have real power. These events do not represent regime change. The political structure of the Islamic Republic is much too complex and tightly woven to fall apart from such attacks, unless there is a serious shift from within.
For example, some military elites could decide not to worsen the crisis and move toward a coup, opening limited space for a section of the opposition. However, this is a very unlikely scenario.
A more realistic scenario is what the Iranian people have been doing for over a decade: organizing and resisting from below. These protests have been repeatedly repressed but continue, remaining subjective and alive.
As for the Islamic regime itself, despite the recent damage, internal factions still have enough capacity to manage the country and adjust foreign policy without making fundamental changes to the regime’s overall structure.
What is your assessment of the military dimension of the situation amid ongoing Israeli airstrikes? It appears that the Iranian air defense has been disabled. How would the Islamic Republic of Iran react militarily and diplomatically?
It’s now clear that Iran has no significant air defense capabilities. Russia never upgraded Iran’s air defense systems under the pretext of sanctions and refused to provide S-300 or S-400 systems. China followed the same approach. Iran’s most advanced fighter jets are leftovers from the Shah’s purchases in the 1970s. They are no match for Israel’s modern air force.
According to multiple reports and available evidence, what remained of Iran’s air defense infrastructure has now been destroyed. The skies over Iran are unprotected against Israeli air power. In the coming hours, the regime will most likely launch its expected missile response. There is also a growing debate over accelerating the development of a nuclear bomb. Whether that is technically or politically realistic is open to question. Still, some members of parliament have openly asked Khamenei for permission.
Overall, Iran’s actual military capability is far weaker than the regime has claimed. By midday on June 13, several military airports had been hit. The missile base in western Iran (Kermanshah), which was used in previous attacks against Israel, was almost completely destroyed. Similar reports have come from other cities, including Tabriz.
For now, it appears that Iran is pursuing diplomatic complaints through its regional allies while managing the fallout.
Cover photo: Devastation after the Israeli strike against the home of slain commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards (source: Facebook)
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