Siyavash Shahabi: Had it been signed, the American-Iranian nuclear agreement would have led to de-escalation in the Middle East
The interview, first published by Vladimir Mitev’s blog Persian Bridge of Friendship, was conducted on the eve of the IAEA’s resolution condemning Iran for its inadequate compliance with its nuclear program obligations, which was adopted on June 12, 2025, before the devastating Israeli airstrikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 13, 2025. The interview discusses the prospects of the American-Iranian nuclear agreement and the extent to which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has true reform intentions.
Following the fall of Bashar Assad’s government, Turkish and Israeli influence in Syria increased at the expense of Iranian influence. Also, important resistance groups considered Iranian proxies by the international press, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, were weakened. To what extent has the Iran-led axis of resistance in the Middle East come to an end? How is the Iranian government resetting its regional foreign policy after Assad’s fall?
Assad’s fall, occurring alongside financial and legitimacy crises in Iran, has dealt a strategic blow to the so-called ‘axis of resistance’. Actors who functioned as Iran’s geopolitical arms just a year ago are now inactive, mired in internal turmoil, lacking legitimacy, or under heavy military and political pressure.
What we are witnessing is not the complete end of the axis of resistance but rather a shift in its role—from a resistance project to a bargaining asset for the Islamic Republic. Tehran no longer has the capacity to launch costly foreign ventures. Instead, it uses the “symbol of resistance” to gain leverage in negotiations. What remains is not resistance itself, but a “performance of resistance” in the regional power market.
Iran has been conducting indirect negotiations with the United States regarding the Iranian nuclear program and the easing of anti-Iranian sanctions. What is the likely outcome of these negotiations? What are the most probable conditions of the new nuclear agreement being discussed? What are the most contentious issues in the negotiations?
A limited, transactional agreement is the likely outcome. Iran might freeze uranium enrichment above 60% and accept some IAEA inspections in exchange for partial sanctions relief. This is something that Pezeshkian brought up again a few days ago. In this case, Russia recommends that Iran send its excess enriched uranium out of the country, where it would be converted into fuel. The former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said in an interview that Russia did not allow the use of domestic fuel in the Bushehr reactor. This has led officials to emphasize the independence of the nuclear program. However, it does not seem that other powers, apart from the United States, are satisfied with this.
How are the EU, Germany, France, and the UK reacting to the American-Iranian negotiations? What will their role be in Iran’s potential reintegration into the global economy after a potential American-Iranian nuclear agreement?
European powers, particularly France and Germany, support a nuclear deal that provides Iran with economic access and reduces the risk of war. However, their leverage is limited. The EU has lost strategic autonomy in the region and often follows U.S. leadership. If a deal is signed, European firms may hesitate to return to Iran unless they receive clear guarantees against U.S. secondary sanctions. Politically, though, the EU is likely to frame Iran’s reintegration as a diplomatic and normalization success.
What role will Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel play in the Middle East after a new nuclear agreement is, eventually, reached? Will we see an increase in trade and investment among them? Can we expect a more economically and politically integrated Middle East in the mid-term, as well as a more peaceful region?
While a renewed deal will not dramatically alter the regional balance, it may create opportunities for de-escalation. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are already pursuing pragmatic relations with Iran, focusing on trade and energy corridors. Israel remains the main opponent and may use the deal to justify more covert operations.
A politically and economically integrated Middle East is possible in the medium term, but only under certain conditions. Economic integration requires legal frameworks, coordinating institutions, and a level of mutual trust that are currently lacking. What is emerging is not true unity but rather a form of “calculated coexistence” between states, each of which operates based on its national interests. In this model, cooperation is possible, but it is not based on political or social convergence.
A shift toward a more inclusive and stable regional order will only be feasible if countries like Iran carry out institutional reforms, reduce proxy interventions, and scale back internal repression. Without these changes, the region will likely face fragile stability and short-lived, unpredictable forms of cooperation.
Iran signed a strategic partnership with Russia this year, and it has relied on China for years to keep its economy afloat. What will happen to Iranian-Russian and Iranian-Chinese relations after a potential new nuclear agreement is signed?
In recent years, especially after the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran’s relationships with Russia and China have become strategic yet unequal. Acting as both political allies and economic competitors, these two countries have used Iran’s international isolation to expand their influence, extract concessions, and strengthen their positions in Southwest Asia. However, if a new agreement is signed between Iran and the U.S. and sanctions are eased, the dynamics of these relationships will shift—though not necessarily in Iran’s favor.
The key point is that, particularly within the emerging multipolar world order, both China and Russia prefer a semi-isolated, manageable Iran that is not strongly connected to the West. Any deal that pulls Iran closer to the Western sphere would be unwelcome for both powers. Therefore, if such an agreement were to be made, Beijing and Moscow would likely intensify their efforts to maintain leverage in Iran through infrastructure projects, intelligence influence, or interference in the Islamic Republic’s internal power struggles.
What important reforms is the Pezeshkian government introducing in Iran? Can we expect a more liberal attitude toward the hijab and a strengthening of women’s, workers’, minority, and human rights? What other areas could Pezeshkian’s reform agenda cover?
Pezeshkian represents the technocratic, neoliberal wing of the regime and aims to normalize foreign relations and stabilize the economy. Symbolic relaxations on hijab and women’s rights may occur, but structural control mechanisms will remain. Real reforms regarding labor rights, minority rights, and political freedoms are unlikely to occur without pressure from below.
The Pezeshkian agenda is about restoring investor confidence, not democratization. It’s a recalibration of power, not a redistribution of it.
What is your overall judgment of the developments in the Middle East and Iran since Pezeshkian took office? To what extent is the social and economic situation of Iranians improving, or are they more likely to improve? To what extent is Iran undergoing positive transformation in its international relations? What obstacles remain to achieving greater political, economic, and social security for Iranians in the Trump 2 and Pezeshkian eras?
The election of Masoud Pezeshkian, a figure aligned with the reformists who has the support of segments of Iran’s technocratic and middle-class elite, does not represent a rupture in the Islamic Republic’s trajectory, but rather a recalibration of its survival strategy. His presidency consolidates a political shift that began with the 2023–2024 regional de-escalation efforts with Saudi Arabia and the regime’s participation in international financial mechanisms, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Domestically, Pezeshkian’s presidency signals a tactical softening of rhetoric around cultural and gender norms, potentially easing the enforcement of the mandatory hijab and granting symbolic concessions on civil liberties. However, the deeper authoritarian structure, dominated by the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and parallel intelligence institutions, remains untouched. These centers of power continue to dictate foreign and security policy, which severely constrains any promises of liberal reform. Without institutional accountability, reforms risk becoming merely cosmetic—designed to appease international observers and reduce social tensions without empowering civil society or dismantling coercive apparatuses.
Iran continues to suffer socially and economically from systemic inequality, class polarization, and underinvestment in public services. Pezeshkian inherits an economy that is still under severe U.S. sanctions and is increasingly dependent on informal markets and smuggling networks tied to military and clerical elites. Even if a partial nuclear deal is achieved, investment inflows will likely benefit regime-affiliated economic conglomerates, unless radical economic restructuring is pursued—which is beyond Pezeshkian’s capabilities.
Regionally, Iran under Pezeshkian is expected to intensify its pivot toward de-escalation, focusing on regional diplomacy with Persian Gulf states and economic integration via China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This reflects Tehran’s pragmatic recognition that regional confrontation is too costly amid internal fragility. However, these actions do not indicate democratization. They represent a new mode of authoritarian stabilization that is less ideological and more technocratic.
Importantly, Pezeshkian’s election may increase the regime’s legitimacy abroad without resolving its legitimacy crisis at home. Since 2019, mass protests, especially the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, have revealed a generational rift between the state and society. Pezeshkian may delay but not reverse this dynamic.
In conclusion, Iran’s outlook under Pezeshkian is one of superficial stabilization layered over a structural crisis. There is little evidence of positive transformation unless social movements can translate protests into an organized political force from the bottom up. Otherwise, the regime’s flexibility will remain a survival strategy, not a strategy for renewal.
To what extent have the dynamics of relations between the Pezeshkian government and the Iranian diaspora in Europe changed? Would a reformist president be more open to engaging with Iranians abroad and be a better option for them when dealing with relatives or the state in Iran?
Although there may be softer rhetoric and more openness toward the diaspora, especially the business elite and technocrats, structural distrust remains. Security agencies still control the relationship with exiled Iranians. Although reformist presidents are often perceived as better interlocutors by diaspora communities, most Iranians abroad will remain cautious and disconnected unless laws change and the political system opens up.
How does the EU’s general policy of tightening control on migration influence Iranian migrants and refugees?
The EU’s increasingly securitized migration regime disproportionately affects Iranian migrants and refugees.
Despite being fully aware of the repression, torture, and political executions in Iran, many European countries avoid officially labeling the Islamic Republic as a “repressive regime.” They hesitate to do so because such a designation would create political and legal pressure to accept more Iranian political asylum seekers. As EU states externalize border controls and tighten asylum laws, Iranian refugees—especially women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and dissidents—find themselves caught between a repressive home state and a hostile host system. The contradiction between the EU’s human rights discourse and its actual migration policy is stark, and it exacerbates the precariousness of Iranian lives in exile.
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