Polish Presidential Elections: End of a Liberal Dream That Never Was [Analysis]

From hooligan to president, collapse of the liberal coalition, death of the European dream, Trump’s new ally in Warsaw… These are just some dramatic headlines flooding the European press in the wake of Karol Nawrocki’s victory in Poland’s presidential election. Even though a margin of less than one percentage point makes it impossible to draw definitive conclusions about the future of Polish politics, the result confirmed several trends that had long been visible in public opinion polls.

Looking at that data will enable us to understand what really happened — and why the coalition that won the 2023 election has now suffered such a crushing defeat.

The winner of the presidential election, Karol Nawrocki, the Law and Justice (PiS) candidate, secured 50.89 percent of the vote. His opponent, Civic Coalition (KO) candidate Rafał Trzaskowski, received 49.11 percent — out of roughly 21 million votes cast. Voter turnout reached 71.63 percent of eligible voters — the second highest since 2023 parliamentary elections.

How should we interpret these results?

Foremost, Law and Justice knows how to read social emotions. It performs excellently in long-term campaigning, even if all possible campaign parameters seem to be working against the efforts of party dignitaries. This was the case this time as well. Kaczyński managed to make the presidential election a referendum on the government of Donald Tusk, a vote of confidence — or rather no confidence — on the team that has governed Poland since mid-December 2023. It was precisely around this issue that the entire campaign dispute was organized: the ineffectiveness of Tusk’s coalition government and the lack of a vision for Poland.

Analysis, planning, execution — even if carried out under unfavourable conditions — produce results. This plan could not be derailed by personal attacks against Nawrocki. Nor by Nawrocki’s inexperience, awkwardness, or stiffness, visible throughout the campaign, especially in its early stages.

Trzaskowski’s team failed to dictate their terms and impose their topics. They didn’t even manage to create a concrete plan for the election campaign. What did they want us to talk about? What kind of Poland Trzaskowski really stood for? Why exactly was he even running?

To this day, I am rather unable to answer these questions.

Ideological Vacuum

Trzaskowski, even though he was representing the most influential party in Poland, was flailing from one position to another. At times, he veered so far to the right that he provoked laughter — and even more often, pity. Instead of mobilizing the existing liberal voter base and then expanding into new segments of the electorate with a positive, energetic, and sincere vision grounded in his accomplishments, he showed us something that resembled a nervous dance, at best. And his party colleagues did not really help. Top Civic Platform politicians, with their gestures and comments, did more to sabotage Trzaskowski’s campaign than to support it. The same goes for the liberal media clique, possessed by sectarian fervour, gathered around the newspaper of the former anti-communist messiah-intellectual, Adam Michnik.

Moreover, the coalition partners — representatives of the parties forming the government, such as Szymon Hołownia from Third Way or Magdalena Biejat from New Left — not only represented internally divided formations, but tended rather to criticize the government than to participate in the governance in a creative and constructive ways. Their critical stance toward the government was briefly masked by the first-round results, which forced them to endorse Trzaskowski — but it resurfaced immediately the day after the final election results were announced.

In the end, the public realised: no one is truly satisfied with this government’s performance. Beyond removing Kaczyński from power, there are no unifying achievements.

When Tusk announced the plan to hold a vote of confidence in the Sejm — aimed at triggering a three-month protection period during which no new cabinet can be established — it wasn’t even clear whether all members of the coalition parties would vote in support of the government, or whether they would participate in the vote at all.

There is thus no better proof that Donald Tusk’s government has become a prisoner of the narrative proposed by Law and Justice — and by doing so, only serves to validate it.

Steady Decline

This stance only worsens the already dire situation of Tusk’s government. After all, according to the latest CBOS poll, only 32 percent of Poles support Donald Tusk’s cabinet, while 44 percent view it negatively. More than half of respondents are also dissatisfied with the very fact that Tusk holds the office of prime minister.

If parliamentary elections were held just now, Civic Coalition — the umbrella party group led by Civic Platform — would come out on top with 31.1 percent of the vote (basically the same result as when it comes to approving Tusk’s actions). Law and Justice would take second place with 27.2 percent, followed by far-right Confederation at 16 percent. New Left would finish fourth, just passing the threshold with 5.9 percent, according to the latest poll conducted by Opinia24.

The biggest loser, however, would be Third Way. According to the poll, the alliance led by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz and Szymon Hołownia would receive only 4.1 percent — a dramatic drop of 6.6 percentage points compared to the previous survey. With such a result, the coalition would not have entered the parliament at all. Meanwhile, the opposition left-wing party, Together, is noted at 5.5 per cent.

The main driver behind this polling trend — aside from the volatility of Law and Justice’s support, with voters frequently shifting between it and Confederation — is the steady decline in backing for the Civic Coalition’s governing partners, Third Way and New Left.

Who? Nawrocki…

It was not Nawrocki’s victory. It was Trzaskowski’s defeat. This is how the choice of Law and Justice — or rather its capo dei capi, Jarosław Kaczyński — can be summarised in a nutshell.

Nawrocki’s campaign was designed to happen. Figures like Przemysław Czarnek, Patryk Jaki, or other prominent PiS politicians were deliberately passed over, as their potential success — or failure — could have disrupted the fragile internal balance of a party that stands almost entirely on the authority of Jarosław Kaczyński. Instead, the task was given to a relatively unknown figure: a head of a right-wing historical institution, a man who held a nationalist worldview shaped by selective historical narratives, but never spoke on more contemporary political topics and therefore never shared the full scope of his views and opinions.

Crucially, Nawrocki was not to run as Law and Justice’s official candidate. He was presented as a civic, grassroots figure merely supported by Kaczyński’s party. This strategic framing was meant to cushion his fall — or rather, to protect the party from any fallout if he failed.

But then, several unexpected dynamics converged. A wave of disappointment with Tusk’s government. A partial shift of the ruling coalition’s electorate to the far-right Confederation. Calls from key figures within that radically laissez-faire party to vote against Trzaskowski. The demobilisation of the liberal-left base fed up with the inaction of government. And finally, Nawrocki’s carefully conducted campaign, which managed to unite all factions of the right-wing electorate. Together, these factors led to his victory.

It was not a brilliant, landslide victory. Trzaskowski’s lack of vision, his repeated missteps and communication crises, as well as damaging revelations about Nawrocki — his alleged ties to the criminal underworld and the controversial purchase of a flat from a gravely ill elderly man — could have altered the results.

But they didn’t.

In the end, it came down to a margin of just 200,000–300,000 votes.

Presidential Powers

Now, let’s take a quick glance at what the president of Poland actually can do.

Polish head of state has several tools to influence governance — especially when representing a political camp opposed to the parliamentary majority. Most significant is the power to veto legislation, which can only be overturned by a three-fifths majority in the Sejm — a threshold currently out of reach for Tusk’s government. This gives the president real potential to block key reforms and force the entire legislative process into stalemate.

He may also refer bills to the Constitutional Tribunal for review, delaying their enactment and increasing pressure on the government. The president can propose legislation as well, using this to advance his own agenda, particularly on issues that resonate with public opinion.

As commander-in-chief and a co-author of foreign policy, the president holds leverage in security and diplomacy. Though coordination with the government is typical, he can assert independence — for example, by stalling ambassadorial appointments or launching separate diplomatic initiatives.

Finally, the president’s symbolic and institutional powers remain politically significant. These include calling referendums (with Senate approval), granting pardons, and making appointments to top institutions such as the Constitutional Tribunal or National Bank.

Summing up, in times of government weakness, the presidency can serve as both a counterweight to the executive and a centre of political authority in its own right.

Cohabitation

Most likely, Poland will live through a cohabitation process for no more than a year and a half. Because what has this year brought, aside from plummeting government approval ratings? In short: inaction.

The government has delivered none of its flagship promises.

Reducing the burden on businesses? Not really (how much are the Polish businessmen overburdened, is a separate issue). Raising the tax-free allowance? Not implemented. Addressing the housing crisis? Nothing has been done. Abortion, same-sex marriages or civil unions? Not even a draft. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg.

The Civic Coalition entered the election campaign with a pledge to implement ‘100 initiatives’. So far, roughly a third have come into force. The situation is even worse when it comes to the programmes of the coalition partners — but the trend remains the same: this government promises, but does not deliver things.

Yes, the outgoing President Andrzej Duda has so far vetoed six bills and referred several others to the Constitutional Tribunal. But this cannot be blamed for the legislative standstill. Judging by the limited number of laws passed by the current parliament, the president simply hasn’t had much to veto.

And that’s the whole story.

Waiting for…

The core problem with this government is its lack of vision. It offers no perspective, no horizon for the future. No previous administration managed to lose public support so rapidly. While PiS reached a similar level of unpopularity after eight years in power, this government managed to disappoint an equal part of the population in just a year and a half.

After the massive social mobilisation of 2023, the strong electoral performance of all coalition parties, and grand promises of democratic renewal, voters have received… nothing. Aside from superficial gestures — cosmetic reshuffling of supervisory boards in state-owned companies and public media, and a few isolated investigations accompanied by media spectacles involving the police and judiciary — nothing of substance has changed. Nothing that could anchor a broader electoral narrative or justify continued public trust. It’s that simple.

The narrow margin between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, combined with one of the highest voter turnouts in Polish history — second only to 2023 — reveals a deep and growing hunger for change.

The question is: will that change ever come?

Cover photo: Karol Nawrocki meeting his supporters in Bielsko-Biała, Southern Poland, December 2024.

Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!

Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!