The Left in Poland on Crossroads: Civil War as a Recipe for Success? [Analysis]
Despite chronic fragmentation, competing candidacies, and the absence of a unified strategy, the left in Poland achieved its best presidential result in over a decade. Has a saying that unity is the key for a political success just been proven wrong?
In the first round of the presidential election, left-wing candidates collectively received 10% of the vote. Magdalena Biejat, Deputy Speaker of the Senate and a member of the co-ruling New Left party, secured 4.23%. Opposition candidate Adrian Zandberg, who ran a grassroots campaign, received 4.86%. Joanna Senyszyn, a former politician from the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), also running an independent, low-budget campaign, was able to gather 1.09%.
The last time the Polish left achieved a comparable result was in the 2010 presidential election, when Grzegorz Napieralski — then representing the SLD and now a member of Civic Platform — won 13.68% of the vote. Including other minor left-wing candidates, the left as a whole came close to 15% that year.
A success? A modest one, but nevertheless – given the left’s poor performance in both regional and European elections in Poland not so long ago.
And this modest success was not the result of unity, but of internal rivalry — of multiple left-wing candidates mobilizing different segments of the electorate independently of one another.
The 2025 presidential election marked a tentative re-entry of social democracy into the Polish political mainstream. Together (Polish: Razem) party, which had long struggled for political relevance, managed to distinguish itself through the candidacy of Adrian Zandberg. Since its founding in 2015, when it won 3% of the vote and gained access to public subsidies, the party had faced systemic barriers to media visibility and political influence. Liberal elites frequently blamed Together for the collapse of the post-communist left that same year. Under Poland’s D’Hondt electoral system, the fragmentation of the left in 2015, according to the liberal opponents of both left and the sovereignist right, directly contributed to Law and Justice securing an outright parliamentary majority. In 2019, and again in 2023, Together aligned itself with post-communist parties for parliamentary elections.
After the last parliamentary elections the Together party supported the formation of Donald Tusk’s government but chose not to join it — unlike the New Left. The coalition agreement made it impossible to deliver on key campaign promises — a condition that applied equally to the New Left’s programme. Together stated explicitly that it would not trade its political ideals for ministerial or parliamentary positions, in contrast to the New Left, which accepted the tough terms of power-sharing. As a result, Together’s criticism of the government was both visible and vocal throughout the coalition’s early months.
None of Together’s demands made it into the government’s agenda, and its modest presence in the Sejm and Senate — a total of ten seats — was politically negligible. The party’s marginalisation reached a climax when, amid internal disputes, it split. Magdalena Biejat, the de facto leader of the splinter faction composed of 5 members of parliament and around 60 party members out of more than 3 thousand militants, went on to become the presidential candidate of the New Left, in a bid to win the hearts of female voters who tend to be more liberal and often more left-leaning than Polish mainstream.
Against that backdrop, Zandberg’s stronger-than-expected result represented more than a personal success. As polling indicated, he outperformed Biejat, thanks to massive support in the social media and grassroot campaign contributions, which reached approximately 200,000 euro.
The scale of Together’s breakthrough was reflected both in public commentary by members of the New Left and in polling data. Former coalition partners expected that the party would fail even to collect the 100,000 signatures required to register a presidential candidate. Early polls gave Adrian Zandberg and his party no more than 0.5% support. He won much more, and the party’s average polling stands at 5% — precisely the threshold needed to enter parliament in the 2027 elections.
Questions
A closer look at the results reveals that the youngest voters (aged 18–29) stood out distinctly in their electoral preferences. According to an Ipsos exit poll, Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation clearly led this group with around 35% of the vote, but the next one was Adrian Zandberg, securing roughly 19–20%. Magdalena Biejat of the New Left received minimal support among young voters. What about the two top candidates in the overall vote? Rafał Trzaskowski won no more than 12–13%, and Karol Nawrocki was even weaker with 10–11%.
Among students and high school pupils over the age of 18, the vote distribution was similar: Mentzen received 26.3%, Zandberg 25.2%, Trzaskowski 16.1%, and Nawrocki 10.2%. Notably, in mock elections held in secondary schools—where most students are not yet eligible to vote—Zandberg often emerged as the winner, ahead of Mentzen and the mainstream candidates. This suggests that Together may hold untapped potential among the very youngest age cohorts.
Overall, these results point to the emergence of a new polarisation among young voters, one that transcends the traditional divide between Civic Platform and Law and Justice. The key question, however, is whether this trend will persist and whether it can be translated into a lasting political strategy built on the mobilisation of the youngest generation.
What may indicate that this is possible is the fact that since leaving the pro-government coalition, the Together party has tripled in size. From a party of 3,000 people, it is now a force of almost 10,000, which in a country where membership of a political party is extremely rare, is already a significant force. What is more, the majority of those who have joined are people under the age of 30. Interestingly, the party’s leaders are slightly over 40, which clearly indicates the age structure of the party.
Youth’s Realignment
Recent polling data further confirm the scale of public disillusionment. In a survey published on 28 May by OGB, nearly 47% of respondents assessed the government negatively, while only 33% expressed approval. This marks one of the steepest declines in public support for any Polish cabinet since 1989 — all within less than two years of governance. This is particularly interesting in the context of party alignments among young people, that is, people who grew up between 2005 and 2025, a period of complete domination of Law and Justice and the Civic Platform.
It seems that a combination of unfulfilled promises and growing socio-economic frustration has contributed to the increased appeal of so-called “anti-systemic” parties. Both the ruling parties and mainstream opposition parties have both fallen short in delivering on key issues related to human rights, such as civil partnerships, reproductive rights, and meaningful protections for minorities, including the vocal LGBT+ community. The rhetoric surrounding immigration and the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border—often framed in militarised or dehumanising terms—has further alienated those who are sensitive to civil liberties and humanitarian concerns. For many, this disconnect has underscored the extent to which both major parties have shifted towards conservative or managerial pragmatism, offering little space for transformative politics.
At the same time, the economic realities facing the younger generation have worsened significantly. Many young people experience instability in the labour market, including precarious employment, low wages, and limited career prospects. The housing market has become increasingly inaccessible due to skyrocketing prices and limited availability of affordable rentals, making independent living and family planning ever more difficult. These conditions contribute to a broader sense of social stagnation and a lack of future prospects, reinforcing disillusionment with the political establishment.
Against this backdrop, Confederation and, to a far lesser extent, Together party have emerged as attractive alternatives, not necessarily because they are widely trusted, but because they are among the few political actors that openly address the frustrations of younger and economically vulnerable voters. Though ideologically opposed—Confederation promotes radical free-market policies, nationalism, and minimal state intervention, while Together offers a progressive, egalitarian vision rooted in social democracy—both parties signal a willingness to break with the status quo. This capacity to channel frustration into distinct political narratives has given them a competitive edge in specific demographics.
Importantly, their appeal stems not just from policy proposals, but from a deeper sense of responsiveness. Both parties speak directly to the grievances that mainstream politics tends to sideline: a shrinking welfare state, the commodification of basic needs like housing, and a sense of political alienation. Whether this shift in support is enduring or merely a protest vote remains to be seen, but it highlights a growing appetite for alternatives to the centrist consensus that has dominated Polish politics since 2005.
Alienated Left
Yet, the greatest weakness of left-wing parties—Together included—remains their limited support among working-class voters. This group continues to support either Law and Justice or the far right. Among voters with only primary education, Karol Nawrocki received an overwhelming 51.7% of the vote, while the liberal Trzaskowski garnered just 15.8%. Nawrocki’s lead narrowed slightly in the group with basic vocational education but remained substantial: 48.3% compared to 22.1% for Trzaskowski. In contrast, among those with secondary and post-secondary education, both candidates polled nearly equally—29.0% for Nawrocki and 28.6% for Trzaskowski. Trzaskowski gained a clear advantage only among voters with higher education, receiving 37.8% to Nawrocki’s 19.5%. It is within this well-educated segment that Razem and the broader left continue to find the bulk of their traditional support.
Whether it is possible to rescue the working classes from the clutches of the far right should be the main concern of Together activists. Ultimately, leaving Donald Tusk’s government seems like a holy manoeuvre to achieve this goal. Ultimately, the left may become the voice of rebellion in the Polish version of the global conflict between the elite and the people, which in Poland has so far taken the form of a clash between liberals and the right wing.
The massive success of Together party is the first step toward rebuilding a credible left free from the burdens of post-communist legacy, clientelism, and reputational damage — claims Zandberg and his party. As shown in Maria Snegovaya’s book When the Left Moves Right…, these factors continue to undermine the left’s credibility among working-class voters. Any future parliamentary result exceeding the 5% threshold would offer a realistic foundation for Together Party to build an independent parliamentary presence — and, potentially, to revive social democracy in a country long defined by polarisation between liberal-conservatives and right-wing nationalism.
Split Backfires
Moving on to the political arena, however, in light of the latest results, we should also interpret the events of the past year. The architect of the split within the Together party, and of the internal rupture led by Magdalena Biejat, was none other than Włodzimierz Czarzasty — leader of the New Left and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm. It was Czarzasty who, operating behind the scenes, is said to have orchestrated internal disputes within Together, ultimately leading to the party’s division. He was reportedly supported by Agnieszka Dziemianowicz-Bąk, a former Together member and now Minister of Family, Labour and Social Policy. Biejat and her faction were expected to align with Dziemianowicz-Bąk’s bloc of young left-wing reformers within the otherwise ossified post-communist party structure — with the parallel aim of marginalising Together entirely.
The second goal failed. As for the first, the outcome remains contested. On May 1, during a Labour Day demonstration in Łódź, Dziemianowicz-Bąk publicly announced her intention to run for the leadership of the New Left. However, according to rumours circulating within left-wing circles, her decision was neither consulted nor coordinated with the party leadership. As a result, the New Left could find itself by year’s end engulfed in the very kind of internal war it once incited within the Together party.
At the same time, polls show the New Left hovering around 6% support. Should that figure decline further or remain stagnant, party officials driven more by career considerations than ideological conviction may begin to defect — most likely to Civic Platform or, more broadly, to its Civic Coalition. Some members may choose instead to fight for control over the New Left brand, while others could attempt to integrate into the political orbit of the Together party.
2027
The most optimistic scenario for many, with the current polls, remains a joint electoral list between Together and the New Left for the 2027 parliamentary elections. Moreover, it’s being advocated by many commentators, and even politicians of the New Left. In the end, Poland’s D’Hondt method for converting votes into seats rewards larger blocs, making such a strategy arithmetically sound.
But is it still a feasible strategy for Together party?
As one can see in an in-depth analysis of polls and party alignments, as stated also by the members and representatives of Together, a renewed alliance is seen as entirely pointless. In the view of Razem’s strategists, the priority now is to build independently on the momentum generated during the election campaign—by expanding the party’s membership, developing new organisational structures, and consolidating a fresh wave of support. The aim is to establish a lasting point of reference on the political scene, one that appeals not only to the broadly defined liberal-left electorate—estimated at around 20–25% of the population—but also to anti-system and socially-oriented voters who have thus far been drawn to the right. Forming an alliance with the post-communist left would run counter to this strategy. Razem’s objective appears rather to be the marginalisation of the New Left and its eventual absorption into Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition, an umbrella formation dominated by the Civic Platform.
However, whether any meaningful reconciliation remains possible within the Polish left is an open question — and one complicated by years of distrust, fragmentation, and tactical infighting. We will only know the answer to this question in a year or two, when we see the first polls ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.
If this fragmentation continues, it may prevent the left from consolidating power or influence. But in a landscape dominated by disillusionment with the liberal centre and radicalization on the right, the current intra-left competition may paradoxically serve as a catalyst for renewed visibility and political relevance. In the end, it’s also possible that on the table are other, less visible scenarios than those listed above.
Whether this moment leads to lasting renewal or further marginalization will depend on the left’s ability to transform dispersed support into coherent strategy — without relying on fratricide as its primary campaign tool.
Cover photo: Adrian Zandberg during his campaign (source: Zandberg’s official Facebook page).
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