Failing Government, Rising Far Right, and Fragmentation of the Polish Duopoly
The first round of the Polish presidential election offers more than just a snapshot of shifting political preferences — it reveals a systemic unraveling. For the first time since 2005, the political duopoly built around Civic Platform and Law and Justice appears structurally weakened.
Civic Platform’s Rafał Trzaskowski secured 31.36% of the vote, narrowly ahead of Law and Justice’s Karol Nawrocki (29.54%), but the real story lies in what came next: the cumulative strength of radical and protest candidates, and the collapse of the liberal-centrist flank of the government.
Two far-right candidates — Sławomir Mentzen of Confederation (14.8%) and Grzegorz Braun (6.43%) — collectively secured more than one fifth of all vote. Meanwhile, the government’s coalition partners fared poorly: Szymon Hołownia, speaker of the Sejm and candidate of the right-leaning Third Way, received 4.99%, while Magdalena Biejat of the centre-left, pro-government Left party managed only 4.23%. The independent left-wing candidate Adrian Zandberg, running on a grassroots platform, won 4.86%.
The numbers are striking: candidates opposed to Donald Tusk’s government — including those from the far right, the opposition left, and defectors from the ruling coalition — amassed close to 60% of the vote. This outcome reflects more than ideological divergence; it signals a broad-based repudiation of the Tusk government’s performance and strategy.
Recent polling data further confirm the scale of public disillusionment. In a survey published on 28 May by OGB, nearly 47% of respondents assessed the government negatively, while only 33% expressed approval. This marks one of the steepest declines in public support for any Polish cabinet since 1989 — all within less than two years of governance.
The first-round campaign was notable for the conspicuous absence of pro-government messages. None of the candidates aligned with the ruling coalition actively endorsed the government’s record. Even Trzaskowski distanced himself from what the Prime Minister was working upon, recognizing that overt association with Donald Tusk’s cabinet could only harm his campaing. The inability to articulate a coherent policy legacy or forward-looking vision rendered positive campaigning virtually impossible.
Against this backdrop, the presidential contest became a de facto referendum on the government. Law and Justice, Confederation, and even the anti-establishment left capitalized on this dynamic. The result: a fragmented but decisive rejection of the incumbent coalition.
The Braun Factor and the Radicalisation of the Right
Of all the outcomes, the most unexpected — and politically consequential — was the performance of Grzegorz Braun. A fringe figure famous for antisemitic and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, Braun has become a magnet for voters radicalized by both economic resentment and cultural anxiety. He is notorious for disruptive “parliamentary interventions” involving physical altercations, vandalism, and symbolic acts such as the burning of EU flags. His platform includes calls for the “de-Judaization” of Poland and a categorical rejection of Ukrainian migration.
Braun’s rise is inseparable from the transformation of Poland’s broader right-wing ecosystem. Law and Justice, once the dominant force on the right, has seen its electorate fragment. In 2019, it commanded 45% support; by 2023 that figure had dropped to 35%. Confederation, with Braun among its former members, captured 7% in the last parliamentary elections. The current alignment suggests an acceleration of voter migration from Law and Justice to both the libertarian-right (Mentzen) and the authoritarian-radical (Braun).
Particularly noteworthy is the erosion of support for the Third Way, a coalition that previously offered a moderate right-wing alternative. In the presidential election, a segment of its electorate appears to have shifted to the far right, disillusioned by both government incompetence and a broader rightward turn in public discourse.
Mainstreaming the Far Right
Tusk’s government has inadvertently legitimized elements of the far-right agenda. It has embraced harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric, introduced restrictions on social welfare for unemployed Ukrainians, and adopted a militaristic narrative focused on national strength and security. Economic measures have also pandered to laissez-faire constituencies — such as tax exemptions for the self-employed and high earners — in a bid to retain the economically conservative vote.
Rather than containing the radical right, these moves have facilitated its ascent. Voters no longer view far-right candidates as beyond the pale. The mainstream itself has shifted, leaving room only for extremes and protest politics. In this environment, Braun’s appeal is no longer marginal — it is symptomatic of a broader ideological transformation within the Polish electorate.
A Duopoly in Crisis
What emerges from this electoral map is a party system under strain. The traditional axis of Civic Platform versus Law and Justice no longer captures the political reality on the ground. Together, these two parties garnered just over 60% of the vote — a far cry from their combined dominance in previous cycles. Meanwhile, the left — fragmented but increasingly assertive — recorded its strongest showing in a decade. Confederation, once a fringe formation, is now a major force on the right.
Whether this moment represents a temporary realignment or a more durable transformation remains to be seen. But one conclusion is hard to avoid: the old duopoly is faltering, and Poland is entering a new era of political fragmentation, radicalization, and volatility.
Cover photo: Trzaskowski and Nawrocki during pre-elections debate (screenshot)
Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!
Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!
About The Author
